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I. INTRODUCTION
Many Americans research their ancestry to determine whether their
pedigrees reveal titled forebears. After the state Supreme Court's ruling
in City ofFircrest v. Jensen,' lawyers in Washington may be undertaking
a similar genealogical effort-combing through old session laws in the
hope that a bill's legislative ancestors might provide a title to legitimize
an act disputed in the present day.
In Fircrest, a four-justice plurality of the state Supreme Court
wrongly voted to revive the St. Paul2 rule, under which the title of an
"original act" may be used to determine whether a subsequent "amenda-
tory act" complies with the subject-in-title3 requirement of Article II,
section 19 of the state constitution. 4 Although five justices voted to over-
rule St. Paul, the Fircrest plurality's holding eliminates the requirement
that an amendatory bill carry on its face a substantive statement of its
t Kristen L. Fraser holds degrees in law and political science from the University of Washington.
She serves as Senior Counsel and Records & Litigation Coordinator for the Office of Program Re-
search of the Washington House of Representatives and hence is one of "our state's usually infallible
legislative staff." See 14 Op. Wash. State Att'y Gen. 18 (1981). The author would like to thank
other attorneys on legislative staff, particularly Chris Cordes, Steve Jones, and Kyle Thiessen, for
their comments on early drafts of this paper. The author's opinions are her own, and nothing in this
Article constitutes an official position of the House of Representatives, its members or administra-
tion, or the Office of Program Research.
1. 158 Wash. 2d 384, 390, 143 P.3d 776, 779-80 (2006).
2. St. Paul & Tacoma Timber Co. v. State, 40 Wash. 2d 347, 243 P.2d 474 (1952).
3. And, apparently, also the single-subject rule. Compare Fircrest, 158 Wash. 2d at 393, 143
P.3d at 782, with 158 Wash. 2d at 401, 407, 143 P.3d. at 785, 788 (Owens, J., concurring) (St. Paul
rule tests only the act's title, not whether it meets the single-subject test) and 158 Wash. 2d at 410-
12, 143 P.3d at 790-91 (Sanders, J., dissenting) (plurality uses St. Paul to conflate the separate
tests). See infra notes 119, 129-131. This Article focuses on the subject-in-title analysis, but the
plurality's holding on the single-subject test is equally troubling.
4. 158 Wash. 2d at 390-91, 143 P.3d at 779-80.
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subject matter, in disregard of judicial precedent, legislative practices,
and the constitutional purposes of the subject-in-title rule.
This Article takes a closer look at the "dark and bloody ground" 5 of
Fircrest from the perspective of a legislative drafter, and discusses sev-
eral flaws in the Fircrest plurality's approach. First, by focusing on the
title of an "original act," the plurality's resurrection of the St. Paul analy-
sis conflicts with legislative use and implementation of Article II, section
19. Second, Fircrest and St. Paul thwart the purposes of the subject-in-
title rule by undercutting the constitutional requirement of a subject mat-
ter declaration. Third, to compound the plurality's error in resurrecting
St. Paul, none of the court's opinions fully understood the evolution of
the statutes before the court-a review of the statutes' legislative history
demonstrates that the plurality relied on the title of an "original act" that
was not, in fact, within the challenged act's direct legislative "ancestry,"
thus revealing the futility of the "original act" analysis.
Litigants who quarrel with a statute's substance are increasingly
likely to raise procedural challenges to the law-making actions through
which the statute was enacted.6 Given this trend and the prominence of
the St. Paul analysis in the lead Fircrest opinion,7 courts will undoubt-
edly encounter "original act" arguments in future litigation. To promote
legislative intent, the purposes of the subject-in-title rule, and public un-
derstanding of the law, the court should reject the St. Paul reasoning used
by the Fircrest plurality. The legislature is the branch of government
that must interpret and apply the title-subject rule in performing its own
constitutional duties. This Article argues, from the perspective of a
drafter in the legislative branch, that the court should acknowledge legis-
lative practices, expressly overrule Fircrest and St. Paul, and follow its
more numerous decisions that consider exclusively the adequacy of the
5. Batey v. Employment Sec. Dept., 137 Wash. App. 506, 511 n.3, 154 P.3d 266, 268 (2007),
amended on reconsideration, 2007 Wash. App. LEXIS 1244, petition for review filed, June 15,
2007.
6. See Martha J. Dragich, State Constitutional Restrictions on Legislative Procedure: Rethink-
ing the Analysis of Original Purpose, Single Subject, and Clear Title Challenges, 38 HARV. J. ON
LEGIS. 103, 106-07 (2001) (title/subject challenges are easy to make; each case is sui generis and
offers one last chance for political opponents to attack legislation); Michael D. Gilbert, Single Sub-
ject Rules and the Legislative Process, 67 U. PITT. L. REV. 803, 818-20 (2006) (quantifying increase
in single-subject litigation). See also Kristen L. Fraser, Method, Procedure, Means & Manner:
Washington's Law of Law-Making, 39 GONz. L. REV. 447, 452-53 (2003-04) (recent invalidation of
high-profile initiatives in Washington may have increased interest in procedural challenges); e.g.,
Amalgamated Transit Union v. State, 142 Wash. 2d 183, 217, 11 P.3d 762, 786 (2000) (invalidating
1-695 on multiple grounds, including single-subject, subject-in-title, amendment without setting
forth, and exceeding initiative power).
7. Fircrest, 158 Wash. 2d at 390-92, 143 P.3d at 779-81.
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title actually placed before the legislature and the public in the legislation
at issue.8
II. BACKGROUND
A. Article II, Section 19: The Washington State Constitution's
Title/Subject Rule
1. Judicial Treatment of the Subject-in-Title Rule
Article II, section 19 of the Washington Constitution establishes
subject and title requirements for legislation: "No bill shall embrace
more than one subject, and that shall be expressed in the title." 9 The ti-
tle/subject rule contains two separate but related procedural restrictions
on the law-making power. The single-subject rule prohibits legislation
from having more than one subject. 10 The subject-in-title rule, on which
this Article focuses, requires that a bill's subject be expressed in its ti-
tle.11 According to a statehood-era commentator, taken together, these
two aspects of the title/subject requirement have three purposes:
1. To prevent hodge-podge or logrolling legislation;
2. To prevent surprise or fraud upon the legislature by means of
provisions in bills of which the titles gave no intimation, and which
might therefore be overlooked and very carelessly and unintention-
ally adopted; and
3. To fairly apprise the people, through such publication of legisla-
tive proceedings as is usually made, of the subjects of legislation, in
8. See infra notes 26, 100, 123 (St. Paul not used since 1971 and abandoned in the last 35
years).
9. WASH. CONST. art. II, § 19.
10. E.g., Amalgamated Transit, 142 Wash. 2d at 216-17, 11 P.3d at 785-86 (even with general
title, initiative unconstitutionally contained multiple subjects because license fee caps lacked rational
unity with voter approval requirement for tax increases); State Legislature v. State, 139 Wash. 2d
239, 985 P.2d 383 (1999) ("substantive law" in budget proviso is a second subject); Barde v. State,
90 Wash. 2d 470, 584 P.2d 390 (1978) (even where title "taking or withholding of property" encom-
passed both parts, bill contained multiple subjects because no rational unity between "dognapping"
and civil replevin); Power, Inc. v. Huntley, 39 Wash. 2d 191, 198-99, 235 P.2d 173, 178 (1951)
(corporate income tax could not be combined with appropriations legislation); see also Harland v.
Territory, 3 Wash. Terr. 131, 145, 13 P. 453,458 (1887) (citing THOMAS COOLEY, CONSTITUTIONAL
LIMITATIONS 173 (5th ed. 1883)).
11. E.g., Grange v. Locke, 153 Wash. 2d 475, 497-98, 105 P.3d 9, 21-22 (2005); Citizens for
Responsible Wildlife Mgmt. v. State, 149 Wash. 2d 622, 638, 71 P.3d 644, 653 (2003); see Fraser,
supra note 6, at 460, 466; Dustin Buehler, Comment, Washington's Title Match: The Single-subject
and Subject-in-title Rules ofArticle I1, section 19 of the Washington State Constitution, 81 WASH. L.
REV. 595, 604 (2006).
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order that they may have opportunity of being heard thereon by pe-
tition or otherwise, if they so desire. 
2
The single-subject rule serves the first of these purposes, 13 and the sub-
ject-in-title rule promotes the latter two objectives. 4
Briefly, the subject-in-title rule requires that a bill's title contain a
declaration of its subject matter. 15  Unlike many other state
constitutions, 16 Washington's constitution does not include an express
12. THOMAS COOLEY, CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS 173 (5th ed. 1883) (cited in Harland v.
Territory, 3 Wash. Terr. 131, 145, 13 P. 453, 458 (1887)).
13. Power, Inc. v. Huntley, 39 Wash. 2d 191, 199, 235 P.2d 173, 178 (1951); Harland, 3 Wash.
Terr. at 145, 13 P. 453 at 458 (pre-statehood ruling interpreting territorial organic act). In particular,
the single-subject rule is intended to prevent the passage of separate subjects which on their own
could not command a legislative majority. Power, Inc., 39 Wash. 2d at 198 (neither the corporate
income tax bill nor the appropriations bill could pass on its own). A related purpose is preventing
the attachment of an unpopular provision onto a popular, unrelated subject in order to guarantee the
former's passage. Flanders v. Morris, 88 Wash. 2d 183, 186, 558 P.2d 769, 772 (1977) (in addition
to notice problems under subject-in-title, even if legislators had notice they would be wary of reject-
ing a single provision, because the budget bill must pass to fund state government, and under confer-
ence committee procedures it may not be amended). Grange v. Locke, 153 Wash. 2d 475, 491, 105
P.3d 9, 18 (2005). See also WASHINGTON STATUTE LAW COMMITTEE, BILL DRAFTING GUIDE 8
(20 0) [hereinafter BILL DRAFTING Gu )DE.
That said, the purpose of the single-subject rule must not be confused with the actual text of its
proscription: although it is intended to prevent logrolling by barring multiple subjects, it does not
prohibit logrolling, notwithstanding references in court opinions to "the constitutional prohibition
against legislative vote swapping." Pierce County v. State, 150 Wash. 2d 422, 434, 78 P.3d 640, 647
(2003); City of Fircrest v. Fircrest, 158 Wash. 2d 384, 412, 143 P.3d 776, 790 (2006) (Sanders, J.,
dissenting) (separate, inconsistent pieces of legislation "cannot be logically reconciled other than to
conclude that those voting for SHB 3055 voted for at least one provision they did not support to
ensure passage of those they did. This is evidence of a textbook example of logrolling in violation
of our constitution.") (emphasis added); see Fraser, supra note 6, at 461. Compare WASH. CONST.
art. II, § 19 with U.S. Stats. 32d Cong. Sess. II, ch. 90 § 6 (1853) (Washington Territory's Organic
Act) ("To avoid improper influences, which may result from intermixing in one and the same act
such things as have no proper relation to each other, every law shall embrace but one object, and that
shall be expressed in the title.").
14. "The purpose behind the subject-in-title rule is to guarantee that the members of the legisla-
ture and the public are given notice of the subject matter of a bill." Grange v. Locke, 153 Wash. 2d
475, 491, 105 P.3d 9, 18 (2005) (emphasis added) (citing Pierce County v. State, 150 Wash. 2d 422,
430, 78 P.3d 640, 647 (2003)); Amalgamated Transit, 142 Wash. 2d at 207, 11 P.3d at 781; see
Buehler, supra note 11, 608-9.
15. Numerous judicial decisions and law review articles provide ample background informa-
tion on article II, section 19 and its subject-in-title requirement. Because this Article focuses on the
Fircrest plurality's use of an "original" act's title, this discussion will center on those aspects of the
subject-in-title rule most relevant to the Fircrest case and legislative analysis. See generally Fraser,
supra note 6, at 460-69; Buehler, supra note 11, 604-09 (citing cases); Amalgamated Transit Union
v. State, 142 Wash. 2d 183, 217, 11 P.3d 762, 786 (2000) (citing numerous title examples and in-
validating 1-695 on, among other things, subject-in-title violations); Grange v. Locke, 153 Wash. 2d
475, 497-98, 105 P.3d 9, 21 (2005); Citizens for Responsible Wildlife Mgmt v. State, 149 Wash. 2d
622, 638, 71 P.3d 644, 653 (2003).
16. See Dragich, supra note 6, at 116-17; compare ALA. CONST. art. IV § 45 ("clearly ex-
pressed in its title") with MO. CONST. art. III, § 23 ("No bill shall contain more than one subject
which shall be clearly expressed in its title") and N.M. CONST. art. IV, § 16 (same).
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"clear title" requirement. Instead, Article II, section 19 directs that a
bill's title give notice of the bill's subject matter either by indicating the
scope and purpose of the law to an inquiring mind or by giving enough
notice to lead to an inquiry into the body of the act.' 7 All that is neces-
sary are a "few well-chosen words, suggestive of the general subject
stated.' 18 An elaborate statement of the subject is not necessary1 9 so long
as a legislator or member of the public, "by a mere glance at a few
catchwords in the title, [would] be apprised of what the act treats, with-
out further search., 20  "A very meager expression will be sufficient, but
some expression there must be.' In other words, the bill title must dis-
close the bill's subject but need not detail the contents.22  For example,
An overly broad title is not, in itself, a violation of article II, section 19. A "title may be
broader than the statute, and still be good as to the subject it fairly indicates." Howlett v. Cheetham,
17 Wash. 626, 635, 50 P. 522, 525 (1897). See St. Louis Health Care Network v. State, 968 S.W. 2d
145, 147 (Mo. 1998) (en bane) (broad title "relating to certain incorporated and non-incorporated
entities" failed to satisfy Missouri constitution's "clearly expressed" requirement).
Notwithstanding Washington's lack of a textual "clear title" requirement, language in some
rulings appears to import such an obligation. Patrice v. Murphy, 136 Wash. 2d 845, 852, 966 P.2d
1271, 1274 (1998) ("This court has long interpreted article 11, section 19 to require the titles of bills
to give clear information as to their contents") (emphasis added); Charron v. Miyahara, 90 Wash.
App. 324, 326, 950 P.2d 531, 534 (1998) (referring to "title specificity" requirements of WASH.
CONST. art. II, § 19); Batey v. Employment Sec. Dept., 137 Wash. App. 506, 513, 154 P.3d 266, 270
(2007), amended, 2007 Wash. App. LEXIS 1244, petition for review filed, June 15, 2007; see infra
note 22 (use of quasi-due process analysis in subject-in-title inquiry).
17. Grange v. Locke, 153 Wash. 2d 475, 491, 105 P.3d 9, 18 (2005); Amalgamated Transit,
142 Wash. 2d at 217, 11 P.3d at 786; Washington Fed'n of State Employees v. State, 127 Wash. 2d
544, 554, 901 P.2d 1028, 1033 (1995); YMCA v. State, 62 Wash. 2d 504, 506, 383 P.2d 497, 498-
99(1963).
18. Amalgamated Transit, 142 Wash. 2d at 209, 11 P.3d at 783; see Fraser, supra note 6, at
463, 466. Consistent with the purpose of giving notice, courts give words in a title their ordinary
meaning, rather than any particular definition assigned to those terms within the bill. Grange, 153
Wash. 2d at 496-97, 105 P.3d at 21 ("qualifying primary" interpreted generically); Amalgamated
Transit, 142 Wash. 2d at 227, 11 P.3d at 791 ("tax" carried its ordinary meaning, not the initiative's
broad definition); Petroleum Lease Props. Inc. v. Huse, 195 Wash. 254, 257-58, 80 P.2d 774, 778
(1938) (no indication that term "securities" in title included oil and gas leases).
19. State ex rel. Wash. Toll Bridge Auth. v. Yelle, 32 Wash. 2d 13, 26, 200 P.2d 467, 474
(1948).
20. State ex rel. Seattle Elec. Co. v. Superior Court, 28 Wash. 317, 321, 68 P. 957,959 (1902).
21. Harland v. Territory, 3 Wash. Terr. 131, 146, 13 P. 453,458 (1887) (interpreting territorial
organic act's title/subject rule, "every law shall embrace but one object, and that shall be expressed
in the title").
22. The requirement that a title contain some substantive notice of a bill's subject matter
should not be confused with the more stringent notice requirement of a due process analysis, which
applies to legislation's contents and not its title. E.g., City of Spokane v. Neff, 152 Wash. 2d 85, 90,
93 P.3d 158, 160 (2004) (in considering whether prostitution loitering ordinance was unconstitution-
ally vague, inquiry was whether a person of ordinary intelligence would have "fair notice" of what
conduct the ordinance prohibited). Some subject-in-title rulings employ language evidently based
on due process considerations, e.g., "Article II, section 19's prohibition requires a bill title to give
notice to the general public and, most especially, to parties whose rights and liabilities are affected
by the bill." Patrice v. Murphy, 136 Wash. 2d 845, 854, 966 P.2d 1271, 1275 (emphasis added).
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"AN ACT Relating to liquor sales" need not declare in its title whether it
reimposes Prohibition or expands state liquor store hours to Sundays, so
long as the bill relates to liquor sales and does not include provisions re-
lating to, for example, toxic waste or farm animals.
In determining whether a bill's title satisfies the constitutional re-
quirements, Washington courts recognize two types of titles: general ti-
tles, which are liberally construed to embrace all provisions fairly within
23the subject matter statement, and restrictive titles, which carve out a
particular part or branch of a subject and for which provisions of the bill
not fairly within the title will not be given force.24 With the exception of
St. Paul and its "meager offspring," 25 courts do not draw other types of
distinctions among titles, such as the contrast made by the Fircrest plu-
rality between "original" and "amendatory" titles.26
Likewise, in Fray the court rejected the title "technical corrections to ch. 35, laws of 1991" because
it did "not give fair notice that... Plan II members no longer have the right to sue their employers."
Fray v. Spokane County, 134 Wash. 2d 637, 652, 952 P.2d 601, 608 (1998); see also Batey v. Em-
ployment Sec. Dept., 137 Wash. App. 506, 513-14, 154 P.3d 266, 270 (2007), amended 2007 Wash.
App. LEXIS 1244, petition for reviewfiled, June 15, 2007.
These separate inquiries should not be conflated. As noted in COOLEY, supra note 12, the
public notice purpose of the constitutional provision is to inform the public of legislation's subject
matter during the legislative process; this section does not require the title to give due process "fair
notice" of the legislation's actual mandates or proscriptions. In Fray, for example, the narrow title
"technical corrections" simply did not indicate that substantive rights were affected, resulting in
material outside the title's scope, but the constitution would have been satisfied if the bill were
broadly titled "AN ACT relating to the law enforcement officers' and fire fighters' retirement sys-
tems." In that case, though such a title does not declare the contents, it embraces them, and alerts the
citizen or legislator that further investigation is necessary. Fray, 134 Wash. 2d 637, 952 P.2d 601.
23. In re Boot, 130 Wash. 2d 553, 566, 925 P.2d 964, 971 (1996); Gruen v. State Tax Comm'n,
35 Wash. 2d 1, 22, 211 P.2d 651, 664, overruled on other grounds by State ex rel. Wash. State Fin.
Comm. v. Martin, 62 Wash. 2d 645, 384 P.2d 833 (1963); State ex rel. Toll Bridge Auth. v. Yelle,
32 Wash. 2d 13, 26, 200 P.2d 467, 474 (1948); State v. Thomas, 103 Wash. App. 800, 807-09, 14
P.3d 854, 857-60 (2000); see Fraser, supra note 6, at 463, 466.
24. Batey, 137 Wash. App. at 513, 154 P.3d at 270 (2007), amended, 2007 Wash. App. LEXIS
1244, petition for review filed, June 15, 2007; Daviscourt v. Peistrup, 40 Wash. App. 433, 437, 698
P.2d 1093, 1097 review denied, 104 Wash. 2d 1008 (1985); Cory v. Nethery, 19 Wash. 2d 326, 329-
31, 142 P.2d 488, 490 (1943); DeCano v. State, 7 Wash. 2d 613, 623, 110 P.2d 627, 632 (1941).
25. City of Fircrest v. Jensen, 158 Wash. 2d 384, 401, 143 P.3d 776, 785 (2006) (Owens, J.,
concurring).
26. See infra note 190 (St. Paul and the four cases that follow it); Fircrest, 158 Wash. 2d at
390-91, 143 P.3d at 789-90 (St. Paul is "absent" from more recent cases; most cases declined to
follow St. Paul and analyzed the "amendatory title"); Fircrest, 158 Wash. 2d at 401-02, 405-07, 143
P.3d 785-86 (concurrence) (that St.Paul was an anomaly is demonstrated by its "meager offspring"
and silent but clear overruling by the past 25 years [actually 35] of judicial decisions; "dozens" of
cases "ignore" St. Paul); Fircrest, 158 Wash. 2d at 412 n.1, 143 P.3d at 790 (dissent) ("St. Paul was
followed by this court on only four occasions, most recently 25 [actually 35] years ago, and with
good reason: its holding has no basis in the constitution."). The youngest of St. Paul's "offspring" is
Belancsik v. Overlake Mem'l Hosp., 80 Wash. 2d 111, 114-15, 492 P.2d 219, 221-22 (1971), de-
cided 35-not 25-years before Fircrest.
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2. The Title/Subject Rule in the Legislature
The constitution assigns to the legislature the role of directly im-
plementing Article II, section 19. Hence, the legislature alone may draft
bill titles.27 The judicial role in implementing Article II, section 19's
application to bill titles arises through interpretation only, not through
any original drafting power.28  Limited solely by the constitution, the
legislator who drafts a bill has complete control over the initial way in
which the subject matter statement in the bill title is written29 and any
number of legislative policy, parliamentary, and political objectives may
affect the way in which a legislator exercises this drafting power.30
Throughout the legislative process, a bill's title consists of two
parts: the substantive subject matter statement 31 preceding the first semi-
colon,32 and the optional "ministerial '33 portion thereafter. For example,
the complete title of Chapter 330, Laws of 2006 (Engrossed Senate Bill
6661) is:
AN ACT Relating to establishing the Washington beer commission;
amending RCW 66.44.800, 15.04.200, 42.17.31907, 42.56.380, and
43.23.033; reenacting and amending RCW 66.28.010; adding a new
section to chapter 66.12 RCW; adding a new chapter to Title 15
RCW; providing an effective date; and providing an expiration
date.34
27. For purposes of the discussion in this Article, ballot titles prepared for measures initiated
by or referred to the voters must be distinguished from bill titles originally drafted by the legislature,
though both types of titles are subject to judicial analysis under article II, section 19. E.g., Wash.
Fed'n of State Employees v. State, 127 Wash. 2d 544, 551, 901 P.2d 1028, 1032 (1995) (article II,
section 19 applies to initiatives). Ballot titles are drafted by the Attorney General (or, rarely, by the
legislature) through a prescribed statutory process, rather than through original legislative drafting.
See WASH. REV. CODE § 29A.72.050 (2006); Fraser, supra note 6, at 460 & n.104. Ballot titles
drafted under this process may be appealed to the Thurston County Superior Court, where the court
may "render its decision and file with the secretary of state a certified copy of such ballot title or
summary as [the court] determines will meet statutory requirements." WASH. REV. CODE §
29A.72.080.
28. Again, ballot measure titles are an exception. Id.
29. In the Senate, the title may be subject to parliamentary challenge. See infra notes 35-38
and accompanying text (parliamentary challenge).
30. See infra notes 142-45 and accompanying text (drafting objectives).
31. Also referred to as the "narrative description," see Fircrest, 158 Wash. 2d at 417, 143 P.3d
at 793 (Sanders, J., dissenting) (citing Thomas, 103 Wn. App at 808); the "descriptive title," Fir-
crest, 158 Wash. 2d at 405, 143 P.3d at 787 (Owens, J. concurring); or the "legal title," BILL
DRAFTING GUIDE, supra note 13, at 49.
32. See WASH. STATE. HOUSE RULE 1 I(G) (2007) (subject matter statement precedes the first
semi-colon).
33. See infra notes 39-42 and accompanying text (ministerial title).
34. 2006 Wash. Sess. Laws ch. 330.
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In this example, the subject matter statement is "establishing the Wash-
ington beer commission," and the remainder of the title is deemed minis-
terial.
For parliamentary purposes, treatment of the substantive subject
matter statement differs somewhat in the Senate and the House of Repre-
sentatives. In the House, a bill's subject matter statement is fixed once
the bill is introduced-House rules expressly prohibit amendment of the
subject matter statement in the title.35 Senate rules authorize parliamen-
tary challenges to a bill's title and do not prohibit amendment of the title
to better reflect the bill's contents. 36 Permitting substantive title amend-
ments promotes notice and disclosure of a bill's subject at all stages in
the legislative process, given that the precise issue addressed by a bill
may change throughout the legislative process. 37 The enrolled bill doc-
trine, which prevents courts from scrutinizing the procedures by which a
bill was passed if the act is fair on its face, prohibits judicial scrutiny of
the legislature's choice to amend a bill title's subject matter statement.38
35. WASH. STATE HOUSE RULE 1 I(G) (2007) ("The subject matter portion of a bill title shall
not be amended in committee or on second reading. Changes in that part of the title after the subject
matter statement shall either be presented with the text amendment or be incorporated by the chief
clerk in the engrossing process."). See BILL DRAFTING GUIDE, supra note 13, at 49 ("Changing the
legal title of a bill (the material before the first semicolon) is rarely done in the senate and forbidden
in the house. If a change in the legal title is desired, the requester should consult with senate or
house of representatives leadership for approval.").
36. WASH. STATE SENATE RULE 25 (2007) (reciting language of article II, section 19). E.g.,
Senate Journal at 454-55 (Wash. 2006) (bill title did not fully express subject; Senate president
invited sponsor to amend title); Senate Journal at 703 (Wash. 1997) ("If the amendment is within the
scope and object of the bill, the Senate may amend the title if necessary."); ef Senate Journal
(House Bill 1187, Wash. April 9, 2007) (Senate rules do not prohibit amending the title of a House
bill, though the House may object when the bill is returned for concurrence); see Fraser, supra note
6, at 470, 475. Compare, e.g., Senate Bill 5131 (Wash. 2005) ("AN ACT Relating to firearms") with
Substitute Senate Bill 5131 (Wash. 2005) ("AN ACT Relating to possession of firearms by persons
found not guilty by reason of insanity"). In ruling on a parliamentary challenge to a bill title, the
presiding officer must leave constitutional interpretation to the courts, but he or she must also inter-
pret and implement the legislative rule. Fraser, supra note 6, at 475 & rn. 251-52. Parliamentary
challenges are waived if not raised. Id at 459.
37. Dragich, supra note 6, at 153. On the other hand, a prohibition on substantive title amend-
ments ensures that a legislator may rely on a fixed title at all stages of the legislative process, such
that an unobtrusive title amendment may not be used to expand or alter a bill's purpose. Parliamen-
tary scope and object rules limit this risk. See infra note 144 (discussing scope and object).
38. Schwarz v. State, 85 Wash. 2d 171, 175, 531 P.2d 1280, 1282 (1975); see Fraser, supra
note 6, at 470, 474-75; cf Grange v. Locke, 153 Wash. 2d 475, 481, 105 P.3d 9, 13 (2005) (referring
to original bill title and amended bill title); see infra notes 176-83 and accompanying text (enrolled
bill doctrine). The enrolled bill doctrine also prevents the court from speculating on whether legisla-
tors were misled by an amendment that changes the text but not the title of the bill. Brower v. State,
137 Wash. 2d 44, 70-71,969 P.2d 42, 57-58 (1998).
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The ministerial portion of the bill title is drafted according to legis-
lative custom rather than constitutional requirements. 39 The portion of a
bill title after the first semicolon typically contains "housekeeping" pro-
visions that list certain components of the legislation.40  This list identi-
fies specific bill sections or contents, such as amended, repealed, or reen-
acted sections, emergency clauses, effective dates, appropriations, or ex-
piration dates. 41  These declarations are updated as the bill progresses
through the legislature and sections are revised, added, and deleted dur-
ing the amendment and engrossing process.42
B. Sections and Statutes-a Brief Overview of Washington's
Law-Making and Codification Process
In Washington, laws enacted by the legislature must be drafted in
the form of bills.43 The component parts of bills are sections. The legis-
lature has drafted bills in this fashion since statehood.44 If enacted and
39. BILL DRAFTING GUIDE, supra note 13, at 8 (citing cases); see also State v. Thomas, 103
Wash. App. 800, 808-09, 14 P.3d 854, 859-60 (2000) (title is "narrative description" in phrase
following "AN ACT Relating to" and preceding the first semicolon, not "ministerial" recitation of
bill sections, which is "surplusage"); Patrice v. Murphy, 136 Wash. 2d 845, 853-55, 966 P.2d 1271,
1274-76 (1998) (analyzing phrase before first semicolon); Flanders v. Morris, 88 Wash. 2d 183,
188, 558 P.2d 769, 773 (1977) (title need not be an "index"); Washington Fed'n of State Employees
v. State, 127 Wash. 2d 544, 557, 901 P.2d 1028, 1035 (1995) (title need not specifically express that
repealers are included); Maxwell v. Lancaster, 81 Wash. 602, 607, 143 P.157, 159 (1914) (under a
title relating to a general subject, the legislature may "repeal existing laws as well as create new
ones"); Bennett v. State, 117 Wash. 2d 483, 488-90, 70 P.3d 147, 150-51 (2003) (analyzing phrase
before first semicolon).
40. BILL DRAFTING GUIDE, supra note 13, at 8.
41. Id. at 8-9 (citing cases). For example, in an omnibus alcohol and controlled substances act,
Chapter 271, Laws of 1989, which was the subject of title/subject challenges in both State v. Jenkins,
68 Wash. App. 897, 900-01, 847 P.2d 488, 489-90 (1993), review denied, 121 Wash. 2d 1032, and
Acevedo v. State, 78 Wash. App. 886, 899 P.2d 31 (1995), the ministerial items listed included:
amended sections, sections added to various chapters, new sections, new chapters, reenacted sec-
tions, penalties, effective dates, expiration dates, appropriations, and declaration of an emergency.
42. BILL DRAFTING GUIDE, supra note 13, at 49; WASH. STATE HOUSE RULE 1 1(G) (2007).
An engrossed bill is a bill for which amendments adopted in the house of origin are physically in-
corporated into the bill. BILL DRAFTING GUIDE, supra note 13, at 50; ED SEEBERGER, SINE DIE: A
GUIDE TO THE WASHINGTON STATE LEGISLATIVE PROCESS 230 (University of Washington 1997).
43. "[N]o laws shall be enacted except by bill." WASH. CONST. art. II, § 18. Ballot measures
authorized by Amendment 7 are exceptions to this otherwise applicable requirement that laws be in
the form of bills passed by both houses and either signed by the governor or repassed over her veto.
WASH. CONST. art. II., § 1 (amendment 7); art. III., § 12. Amendment 7 permits voters to enact
legislation (initiatives to the voters), propose legislation to the legislature (initiatives to the legisla-
ture); to reject legislation enacted by the legislature (referendum measures), and to approve or reject
legislation referred by the legislature to the voters (referendum bills).
44. E.g., 1889 Wash. Sess. Laws ch. 2 ("to fund state debt"). The way in which the legislature
chooses to divide a bill into sections affects the governor's veto power, which generally extends only
to entire sections of legislation. WASH. CONST. art. II1, § 12 (Amendment 62); Legislature v. Lowry,
131 Wash. 2d 309, 320-21, 931 P.2d 885, 891-92 (1997), modifying Washington State Motorcycle
Dealers' Assn. v. State, 11 Wash. 2d 667, 763 P.2d 442 (1988); see Fraser, supra note 6, at 489-91.
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signed by the governor, the bills become session laws (also referred to as
chapter laws 45) and the sections are known by section references to those
chapters, e.g., Laws of 1899, chapter 2, section 3. Sections of session
laws may also be incorporated into Washington's codified laws, the Re-
vised Code of Washington (RCW).46
Bills may consist of different types of sections. First, sections may
be new or amendatory. A new section is a new statement of law.47 An
amendatory section is a section of a bill or act that amends a pre-existing
statutory section.48 Whether a section of a bill is drafted as a new section
or as an amendatory section is determined by the bill's structure and con-
tent, the organization of the RCW, and the legislator's objectives, subject
to the constitutional and parliamentary prohibitions on amendment with-
out setting forth in full, which require that the entire text of amended sec-
tions be set forth in the bill.
49
Second, sections may be codified or uncodified. Statutory sections
of a "general and permanent nature" are codified by the Code Reviser5 °
into numbered sections of the Revised Code of Washington (RCW).51
Sections that are temporary in nature (such as appropriations), sections
that are technical or ministerial (such as effective dates, codification di-
rections, or caption disclaimers), and sections for which the legislature
does not otherwise direct codification (such as most intent sections) are
not assigned code section numbers.52  Instead, these sections are
45. SEEBERGER, supra note 42, at 227.
46. WASH. REV. CODE ch. 1.04; BILL DRAFTING GUIDE, supra note 13, at 6; SEEBERGER, supra
note 42, at 237.
47. BILL DRAFTING GUIDE, supra note 13, at 6.
48. See generally BILL DRAFTING GUIDE, supra note 13, at 3-4. Amendatory sections should
be distinguished from amendments, which are proposed changes to a bill and may involve new or
existing sections. See SEEBERGER, supra note 42, at 225; BILL DRAFTING GUIDE, supra note 13, at
44-47.
49. WASH. CONST. art. II, § 37 ("No act shall ever be revised or amended by mere reference to
its title, but the act revised or the section amended shall be set forth at full length."); WASH. STATE
SENATE RULE 26 (2007) (setting forth text of article II, § 37); WASH. STATE HOUSE RULE I I(F)
(2007) ("No act shall ever be revised or amended without being set forth at full length."); WASH.
STATE LEGIS. JOINT RULES 12-13 (2007) (requiring section number and specific formatting for
amendatory changes); see infra note 70 and accompanying text (regarding "jingles" for amendatory
sections); BILL DRAFTING GUIDE, supra note 13, at 5-6 (formatting to indicate amendatory
changes).
50. The Code Reviser is an attorney appointed by the Statute Law Committee to codify into the
appropriate sections of the Revised Code of Washington measures enacted into law. The Code
Reviser also prepares all official bill drafts. See WASH. REV. CODE ch. 1.08; SEEBERGER, supra note
42, at 228.
51. WASH. REV. CODE § 1.04.010; WASH. REV. CODE § 1.08.015(1); see WASH. REV. CODE
ch. 1.08; SEEBERGER, supra note 42, at 18, 228.
52. WASH. REV. CODE § 1.08.017; BILL DRAFTING GUIDE, supra note 13, at 6-7.
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referenced by their session law chapter and section numbers and may be
included in the code as notes to codified sections.
Depending on the subject matter and the extent of preexisting statu-
tory law on the subject, a bill may consist of any combination of new and
amendatory sections. The same sections of law are often amended over
and over again, under different bill titles, for different purposes. For ex-
ample, Laws of 2006, Chapter 277 (HB 2704) established new crimes
relating to organized retail theft. 53 The bill set forth the elements of the
new crimes in new sections added to Chapter 9A.56, Theft and Rob-
bery.54 However, to determine the way in which criminal penalties are
calculated for these new crimes, HB 2704 had to amend title 9, chapter
94A, section 510 of the Revised Code of Washington (RCW) to place the
new crimes on the felony seriousness level table.55 This particular sec-
tion of the RCW has been repeatedly amended over the years-more
than 70 times since it was enacted in 1983 in "AN ACT Related to the
sentencing of criminal offenders. 56 Each of these acts in turn contained
a myriad of new and amendatory sections, depending on the particular
subject addressed by each separate bill.
57
After both houses of the legislature have voted favorably upon a
bill, the bill is known as an "enrolled bill" and is filed with the Secretary
of State.58 At this stage, the bill may also be referred to as an "act,"
though it has not yet been enacted into law.59 When the governor signs
the bill,60 the Secretary of State assigns the act a session law number
based on the order in which the governor signs the bills.
6'
After a bill becomes law, the Code Reviser assigns code section
numbers to new codified sections and incorporates the amendments
made by amendatory sections into the appropriate numbered sections of
the RCW. 62 The RCW is organized into three levels: Titles, 63 chapters,
53. 2006 Wash. Sess. Laws ch. 277.
54. Id. §§ 1-3.
55. Id. § 6.
56. 1983 Wash. Sess. Laws ch. 115 § 3.
57. See infra note 229 and accompanying text (examples of titles under which WASH. REV.
CODE § 9.94A.5 10 has been amended).
58. WASH. CONST. art. III, § 12 (every act that passes the legislature must be delivered to the
governor); WASH. CONST. art. Ill, § 17 (directing Secretary of State to keep a record of the official
acts of the legislature); WASH. REV. CODE § 44.20.010 (the house of the legislature that transmits an
enrolled bill to the governor must also deliver a copy to the Secretary of State); SEEBERGER, supra
note 42, at 230. See infra notes 176-183 and accompanying text (enrolled bill doctrine).
59. WASH. CONST. art. III, § 12; SEEBERGER, supra note 42, at 225.
60. Or, if the governor fails to veto the bill within the constitutionally prescribed period, it
likewise becomes law. WASH. CONST. art. I11, § 12. Washington does not have a "pocket veto."
Fraser, supra note 6, at 490.
61. SEEBERGER, supra note 42, at 227.
62. WASH. REV. CODE §§ 1.08.015-.020; SEEBERGER, supra note 42, at 227.
2007]
Seattle University Law Review
and sections. 64 Titles are the broadest subdivision of the thousands of
sections of law that form the Revised Code of Washington. Many RCW
Titles were created as part of the massive recodification effort that began
in 1951 with the creation of the modem Statute Law Committee and Of-
fice of the Code Reviser. 65 During the 1950s and 1960s, the legislature
passed many such comprehensive recodification acts to revise and con-
solidate the various privately published codes 66 into a consistently de-
nominated statutory code.
67
The ninety-five Titles of the RCW cover topics ranging from the
very broad, e.g., Title 9A, the criminal code, or Title 28A, common
school provisions, to the fairly narrow, e.g., Title 17, weeds, rodents and
pests. Each title is divided into chapters-for example, Title 9A is
Washington's criminal code and consists of chapters such as chapter
9A.32, homicide, and chapter 9A.44, sex offenses. Within each chapter
are codified the individual sections of law-for example, RCW
9A.32.040 defines the crime of murder in the first degree and RCW
9A.32.050 defines the crime of murder in the second degree. As of Janu-
ary 2007, the ninety-five Titles of the RCW comprised 2970 chapters and
nearly 45,000 sections.68
A section of the RCW is the descendant of all the session laws that
created it, as modified by the most recent session law. Each section of
the RCW contains a history note listing that section's statutory predeces-
sors.6 9 When a bill amends a codified section, the "jingle" describing the
legislative action declares that the bill amends both that section of code
and the most recent version of the session laws that constitute that codi-
fied section 70 If the code section has been previously subject to a "dou-
ble amendment" in the session laws in which the legislature amends the
same section twice (or more) in the same session without reference to the
63. For purposes of the discussion in this Article, "Title" as a division of the RCW will be
capitalized to distinguish such divisions from bill titles.
64. See WASH REV. CODE §§ 1.04.014-016, 1.08.015(3).
65. See WASH REV. CODE ch. 1.04 (establishing Revised Code of Washington); ch. 1.08 (estab-
lishing Statute Law Committee and Code Reviser).
66. See generally Kelly Kunsch, Statutory Compilations of Washington, 12 U. PUGET SOUND
L. REV. 285 (1989); Joe V. Panesko, History of Washington State Codification (June 8, 2006) (un-
published presentation to Statute Law Committee on file with author); Joe V. Panesko, Breaking the
Codes-A History of Washington State Codification 6-10 (2004) (unpublished paper on file with
the author).
67. E.g., 1959 Wash. Sess. Laws ch. 28 (reenactment of Title 72, public institutions); 1959
Wash. Sess. Laws ch. 26 (reenactment of Title 74, public assistance). See generally Kunsch, supra
note 66, at 305 (between 1951 and 1963, all titles of the RCW had been restored by the Statute Law
Committee or reenacted by the legislature).
68. Information provided by the Office of the Code Reviser.
69. BILL DRAFTING GUIDE, supra note 13, at 4.
70.Id.
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other amendment, the legislature may subsequently "reenact" the sepa-
rate session laws to incorporate the separate session laws back into the
same section of code.71
Sections of law remain "on the books" until they are repealed or
decodified by the legislature. 72 To repeal a statute, the repealing legisla-
tion must identify every session law that amended the statute.73 If a stat-
ute is challenged in court, the court may have the power to declare inva-
lid all or a portion of the section of law and thereby render it unenforce-
able, but the court lacks the power to repeal or decodify sections; only
the legislature may undertake the statutory lawmaking actions of repeal
and decodification.74 In other words, a judicially invalidated section or
portion thereof does not "disappear" from the code.75 Instead, the section
71. Id. at 5, 17; WASH. REV. CODE § 1.12.025 (construction of double amendments). If the
legislature further amends that section at the same time as the reenactment, the section's "jingle" in
the bill declares this purpose. BILL DRAFTING GUIDE, supra note 13, at 5, 17.
72. The legislature has delegated to the Code Reviser, in consultation with the Statute Law
Committee, a limited authority to remove "manifestly obsolete" provisions from the code. WASH.
REV. CODE § 1.08.015(2)(m). Generally, use of this authority is limited to ministerial sections such
as severability clauses, effective dates, etc. BILL DRAFTING GUIDE, supra note 13, at 13, or other
sections that have manifestly expired on their own terms.
73. BILL DRAFTING GUIDE, supra note 13, at 11-12. The legislature has delegated to the Code
Reviser, in consultation with the Statute Law Committee, a limited authority to decodify a section
that has been repealed without reference to an amendment to the section. WASH. REV. CODE
§ 1.12.025; see BILL DRAFTING GUIDE, supra note 13, at 13. Such decodification may occur only if
the Statute Law Committee determines that the decodification does not conflict with the purposes of
the amendment. BILL DRAFTING GUIDE, supra note 13, at 13.
74. A number of statutes invalidated by the courts have remained codified in the RCW, even
though those judicial rulings render them unenforceable. Compare, e.g., WASH. REV. CODE
§ 44.04.015 (establishing term limits for state legislators) with Gerberding v. Munro, 134 Wash. 2d
188, 205, 949 P.2d 1366, 1374 (1998) (state constitution establishes exclusive qualifications for state
officers and term limit statutes therefore invalid); WASH. REV. CODE § 4.56.250 (limiting none-
conomic damages) with Sofie v. Fibreboard Corp., 112 Wash. 2d 636, 652-53, 771 P.2d 711, 719-
20 (1989) (invalidating statutory cap on noneconomic damages as infringement on right to jury
trial).
75. The distinction between a judicial declaration of invalidity and repeal or decodification
implicates both separation of powers and the drafting requirements of article II, section 37, which
dictates that an amended section must be set forth in full. Apparently under the impression that
judicial invalidation of a section of session law rendered the section decodified (as opposed to being
unenforceable), a King County Superior Court judge struck down Initiative 747 (2002 Wash. Sess.
Laws ch. 1 § 2) on the basis that a section amended by the initiative had previously been judicially
invalidated. Washington Citizens Action v. State, No. 05-2-02052-1 SEA slip op. at 4 (King
County Superior Court, June 13, 2006), review granted. The court therefore concluded that 1-747
violated article II, section 37 by failing to set forth in full the law that was operative as a result of the
prior court ruling, as opposed to the most recent session law enacted through the statutory law-
making process. Id. The superior court relied upon Boeing Co. v. State, which declared that "an
invalid statute is a nullity. It is as inoperative as if it had never passed." 74 Wash. 2d 82, 88-89, 442
P.2d 970, 973-74 (1968) (emphasis added). This statement is correct as far as it goes, but such a
ruling does not smite the section into statutory oblivion, notwithstanding Boeing's comparison of a
judicial declaration of unconstitutionality to a gubernatorial veto, 74 Wash. 2d at 89, 442 P.2d at
974, an analogy at odds with the constitution. The veto is the governor's legislative power, and it is
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remains part of the state's statutory law and may serve as the basis 76 for a
subsequent legislative correction to the section. 77
C. Substitute House Bill 3055 and City of Fircrest v. Jensen
When Fircrest police officer R.J. LaTour contacted young motorist
Theo Jensen in the wee hours of a fall morning, little did the officer
know that his encounter with the motorist would set in motion a study in
separation of powers and an interbranch disagreement over the complex
relationship between the state constitution's title/subject rule and the
processes of statutory evolution.
On October 23, 2004, Officer LaTour pulled over a speeding vehi-
cle in the City of Fircrest.78 Inside, the officer found Mr. Jensen and an
distinctly a statutory law-making power. WASH. CONST. art. III, § 12; Legislature v. Lowry, 131
Wash. 2d 309, 330, 931 P.2d 885, 896 (1997); Hallin v. Trent, 94 Wash. 2d 671, 678, 619 P.2d 357,
361 (1980), overruled on other grounds by Wash. Fed. Of State Employees v. State, 101 Wash. 2d
536, 547, 682 P.2d 869, 875 (1984). A valid veto excises material from an act before it becomes law
as surely as if the legislature had never written it in the first place, 94 Wash. 2d at 671, 619 P.2d at
360, but judicial invalidation merely renders inoperative a section that already had been signed into
law.
The superior court ruling confuses the court's power of constitutional interpretation with the
legislature's power to enact, repeal, and amend statutes. In addition, such reasoning will stymie
legislative drafting-if the legislature uses the predecessor session law rather than the invalidated
section as the basis for future amendment, it is equally vulnerable to the argument that it has violated
article I1, section 37 by failing to set forth in full the most recent legislatively enacted session law.
Furthermore, dozens of challenges to statutes may be pending at any particular time, and the legisla-
ture cannot be required to predict which of these would be successful (much less upheld on appeal)
and thereby trigger an obligation to amend the predecessor session law rather than the current ver-
sion.
76. "The use of outdated versions of the Revised Code of Washington as a basis for preparing
amendatory or repealing legislation results in the inadvertent deletion of current language, the reen-
actment of obsolete language, and other serious consequences." BILL DRAFTING GUIDE, supra note
13, at 4.
77. For example, certain sections in 1995 Wash. Sess. Laws ch. 285, "AN ACT Relating to
insurance fraud," were invalidated on both single-subject and subject-in-title grounds in State v.
Thomas, 103 Wash. App. 800, 14 P.3d 854 (2000), see infra note 184. To correct these deficiencies,
the legislature reenacted, under proper titles and without further amendment, certain sections of the
invalidated 1995 legislation. E.g., 2001 Wash. Sess. Laws ch. 310; see also 2001 Wash. Sess. Laws
ch. 222. Likewise, in McGowan v. State, 148 Wash. 2d 278, 296-97, 60 P.3d 67, 76-77 (2002), the
court invalidated subsection 2(1)(d) of Initiative 732 on substantive constitutional grounds, and it
severed this provision from the remainder of the law. 2001 Wash. Sess. Laws ch. 4 § 2(l)(d). This
action did not excise the subsection from the code and session laws; instead, the legislature amended
WASH. REV. CODE § 28A.400.205 to delete the offending subsection 2003. Wash. Sess. Laws 1st
Sp. Sess. ch. 20 § 1. In a different and apparently unique approach, to address the judicial invalida-
tion of 1982 2d Sp. Sess. ch. 9, the legislature, through the amendment process, restored the changes
wrought by the 1982 law, with the declared purpose of "correcting the relevant RCW sections to
read as though the legislature had not enacted "chapter 9, Laws of 1982, 2d ex. sess., and thereby
make clear the effect of the subsequent amendments in Part II of this act." Compare 1989 Wash.
Sess. Laws ch. 302 §§ 1, 101-103; with Wash. Sess. Laws 1982 2d Ex. Sess. ch. 9 §§ 1-3. In Part II
of the same act the legislature then made further changes to those sections. 1989 Wash. Sess. Laws.
ch. 302 §§ 201, 203, 206 (amending §§ 101-103).
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odor of intoxicants.79 Officer LaTour conducted field sobriety tests and
arrested Mr. Jensen, whose BAC80 results at the police station were 0.043
and 0.042, below the statutory level of intoxication, 8' but above the 0.02
limit for persons under age 21.82 The City consequently charged Mr.
Jensen with being a driver under age 21 consuming alcohol.83
In the spring of 2004, a few months before Mr. Jensen's arrest, the
58th Washington Legislature amended statutes relating to certain vehicu-
lar offenses in a bill entitled "AN ACT Relating to admissibility of DUI
tests. 84 Substitute House Bill (SHB) 3055 consisted of a new, uncodi-
fled intent section (section 1) and three amendatory sections. Section 2
amended RCW 46.20.308 to address search warrants for breath or blood,
implied consent warnings, and breath test machines in medical facili-
ties.85 Sections 2 and 3 amended RCW 46.20.308 and RCW 46.20.3101
respectively to revise references to the BAC threshold for persons under
twenty-one years for the offenses of driving under the influence, physical
control of a vehicle under the influence, and driver under twenty-one
consuming alcohol. 6  Section 4 amended RCW 46.61.506 to address
persons authorized to draw blood for blood tests and to address admissi-
bility of breath tests and independent tests. 87  Significantly, the provi-
sions of section 4 regarding admissibility of breath tests applied not only
to offenses governed by the DUI statute,88 but also to other offenses re-
lating to vehicles and intoxicants, such as the driver under twenty-one
consuming alcohol statute under which Mr. Jensen was charged.
89
78. Fircrest, 158 Wash. 2d at 389, 143 P.3d at 779.
79. Id.
80. BAC may stand for either "blood alcohol content" or "breath alcohol concentration."
WASH. REV. CODE § 46.61.506. Mr. Jensen's breath was tested. Fircrest, 158 Wash. 2d at 389, 143
P.3d at 779.
81. WASH. REV. CODE § 46.61.502.
82. Id. § 46.61.503.
83. Id.
84. 2004 Wash. Sess. Laws ch. 68.
85. Id. § 2.
86. Id. §§ 2-3. Section 2 also reenacted this section of code to address prior double amend-
ments. See supra note 71 and accompanying text (double amendments). Section 2 was originally
enacted in 1969 as part of Initiative 242. 1969 Wash. Sess. Laws ch. I § 1. Before its amendment in
SHB 3055, this section of law had been amended twenty times. See WASH. REV. CODE § 46.20.308
(history note).
87. 2004 Wash. Sess. Laws ch. 68 § 4. As with section 2, section 4 was originally enacted in
1969 as part of Initiative 242. 1969 Wash. Sess. Laws ch. I § 3. Before its amendment in SHB
3055, this section of law had been amended seven times. See infra note 196 (titles for these amenda-
tory acts).
88. WASH. REV. CODE § 46.61.502.
89. Id. § 46.61.503. Fircrest, 158 Wash. 2d at 389, 143 P.3d at 779.
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In City of Fircrest v. Jensen,90 Mr. Jensen challenged the City's use
of his breath test under the new provisions of SHB 3055. He based one
of his arguments9' on the subject-in-title rule, contending that section 4
of SHB 3055 violated Article II, section 19 by including subject matter
beyond its title because it amended breath test admissibility for his non-
DUI offense under the title "AN ACT Relating to admissibility of DUI
tests. '92 Because the legislature gave SHB 3055 the restrictive title "DUI
tests" rather than, for example, the general title "BAC tests," he con-
tended that the amendments in SHB 3055 applied only to DUI cases and
not to other crimes affected by a breath test.
93
III. THE FIRCREST RULING: A DIVIDED STATE SUPREME COURT
UPHOLDS SHB 3055
At the state Supreme Court, a four-justice plurality and a three-
justice concurrence voted to uphold SHB 3055 against the subject-in-title
challenge, with two justices dissenting. Significantly, the plurality and
concurrence employed very different reasoning.
A. Plurality: Title of the "Original Act"
Embraces the Subject Matter of SHB 3055
Justice Charles Johnson, writing for the plurality, declared that the
court's first inquiry in a title/subject challenge is the relevant title of the
act.94 Ordinarily, this question arises only when legislation has both a
bill title and a ballot title, as do referendum measures or initiatives to the
legislature,95 but the Fircrest plurality concluded that a bill which in-
cludes amendatory sections may likewise have more than one title: the
title assigned by the legislature to the "amendatory act," and the title of
the "original act," the act that originally created the sections amended in
the subsequent legislation.96 The plurality concluded under the St. Paul
line of cases that "when an act purports to amend a prior act, the relevant
90. 158 Wash. 2d 384, 143 P.2d 776 (2006).
91. In addition to his contentions based on the subject-in-title rule, Jensen also argued that the
bill contained multiple subjects, violated the separation of powers doctrine, and unconstitutionally
created a mandatory rebuttable presumption. Fircrest, 158 Wash. 2d at 395-400, 143 P.3d at 782-
84; Brief for Appellant at 19-31, City of Fircrest v. Jensen, 158 Wash. 2d 384 (2006); 158 Wash. 2d
384, 390, 143 P.3d 776, 779-80 (2006).
92. Brief of Appellant, at 14, City of Fircrest v. Jensen, 158 Wash. 2d 384, 143 P.2d 776
(2006).
93. Id. at 11-12.
94. Fircrest, 158 Wash. 2d at 390, 143 P.3d at 779-80.
95. See Fraser, supra note 6, at 461-62.
96. Fircrest, 158 Wash. 2d at 390-92, 143 P.3d at 779-80.
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title to be examined under Article II, section 19 is the title of the original
act. "97
Specifically, the plurality held that
[a]ny original act passed by the legislature is subject to traditional
Article II, section 19 challenges. . . .When amending an original
act, it is unnecessary to examine the amendatory title for strict com-
pliance with Article II, section 19, because the underlying act has
already passed such scrutiny.[98] In these cases, we need only in-
quire if the amendatory act explicitly identifies what sections of the
original act it is purporting to amend and that the amendments pro-
posed could have been included in the original act .... [T]he title of
an amendatory act is sufficient if the title identifies and purports to
amend the original act and the subject matter of the amendatory act
is within the purview of the original act.
99
Although the plurality acknowledged that St. Paul had "been called into
question by its absence from more recent Article II, section 19 challenges
regarding amendatory acts,"'100 it adhered to St. Paul, rejecting arguments
that the St. Paul line had been superseded by other analyses and was "in-
correct and harmful." Further, the plurality declared that St. Paul relied
upon a "1908 treatise" and thus reflected the common understanding of
Article II, section 19 at statehood. 10
For these reasons, the plurality determined that the "original act"
was the 1961 legislation that created Title 46 of the Revised Code of
Washington (RCW), and therefore the relevant title was:
AN ACT Relating to vehicles; providing for the regulation and li-
censing thereof and of persons in relation thereto; providing for the
collection and disposition of moneys; enacting a vehicle code to be
known as Title 46 of the Revised Code of Washington-"Motor Ve-
hicles"; providing penalties; repealing certain acts and parts of acts;
and declaring an emergency.
Because the ministerial portion of SHB 3055's title identified by RCW
number the sections of code being amended, i.e., sections in Title 46, the
plurality reasoned that the act met the first prong of the St. Paul test by
"explicitly identifying and announcing its amendment of the original
act,"' 10 3 meaning the 1961 act "Relating to vehicles" that created Title 46.
97. Id. at 390, 143 P.3d at 779 (emphasis added).
98. This statement is puzzling. See infra notes 159-162 and accompanying text.
99. Fircrest, 158 Wash. 2d at 391, 143 P.3d at 780.
100. Id. at 390-91, 143 P.3d at 779-80.
101. Id. at 392, n.3, 143 P.3d at 780, n.3.
102. Id. at 393, 143 P.3d at 781 (citing 1961 Wash. Laws ch. 12).
103. Id. at 393, 143 P.3d at 781.
2007]
Seattle University Law Review
According to the plurality, SHB 3055 met the second prong because pro-
visions relating to blood and breath tests fit within the 1961 title "vehi-
cles. 1 °4 In other words, the plurality concluded that by declaring an in-
tent to amend a prior act, the reference to the code number of a statutory
section in the ministerial portion of a bill title did indeed declare a sub-
ject. For these reasons, the plurality upheld SHB 3055 against both the
subject-in-title challenge and the single-subject challenge in the same
sentence. 105
The Fircrest plurality was mistaken in concluding both that St. Paul
reflected the framers' view at statehood, and that the framers' view per-
mitted reference to a section number to state a subject. First, contrary to
the statement in the plurality opinion, St. Paul did not rely on a state-
hood-era source: St. Paul did not cite a "1908 treatise., 10 6 St. Paul cited
"SUTHERLAND, STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION (3rd Ed.) § 1908,'' 107
without stating a year of publication for the 1943 third edition that it
quoted. In fact, an edition of Sutherland more contemporaneous with
statehood supports the opposite conclusion:
The constitutional requirement ... is satisfied generally if the
amendatory or supplemental act identifies the original act by its ti-
tle, and declares the purpose to amend or supplement it .... It is not
enough to refer to the original act merely by the number of the
chapter of the published laws which includes it. The true and actual
subject or object must be expressed in the title and not by way of
reference to something else to show it. 108
Further, the plurality's claim that St. Paul reflected the prevailing
view at statehood is undercut by Harland v. Territory, one of Washing-
ton's earliest title-subject cases, where the court held that the "clear
weight of authority" was against the position "that a reference to a sec-
tion in the title of an amendatory act, without more, is in any case suffi-
cient" to satisfy the clear-title requirement. 109 Soon after statehood the
104. Id.
105. Id. In addition, the plurality rejected Mr. Jensen's separation of powers and due process
arguments. Id. at 398-400, 143 P.3d at 783-84.
106. Fircrest, 158 Wash. 2d at 392, n.3, 143 P.3d at 780, n.3.
107. 40 Wash. 2d at 355, 243 P.2d at 478-79 (emphasis added).
108. J.G. SUTHERLAND, STATUTES AND STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION § 101 (1891) (emphasis
added). But see J.G. SUTHERLAND, STATUTES AND STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION § 137 (J. Lewis, ed.,
2d ed. 1904) (title of amendatory act need not specify or indicate the nature of the amendment).
109. 3 Wash. Terr. 131, 151, 13 P. 453,461 (1887). At that time, the Organic Act required that
"every law shall embrace one subject, and that shall be expressed in the title." U.S. Stats. 32d Cong.
Sess. II, ch. 90 § 6 (1853). Harlandwent on to add that
[t]he expression of a purpose to amend a particular section of the Code gives it to be un-
derstood that the law is to be changed; but what the law that is to be changed, and in what
respect it is to be changed, is a matter left entirely in the dark.
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court reaffirmed Harland, stating "that a mere reference to a section in
the title of an act does not state a subject .... [T]he title of an amending
act must contain some words which indicate the theme or proposition of
which the act sought to be amended treats." 110 In other words, notwith-
standing St. Paul and its "meager offspring," Article II, section 19 re-
quires a substantive subject matter statement; the ministerial title's reci-
tation of sections amended by the bill does not declare such a constitu-
tionally sufficient "theme" or "proposition." 'l
B. Concurrence's and Dissent's Article II, Section 19 Analysis:
Reject St. Paul and "Original Acts"
Three justices signed a concurring opinion and two a dissent, both
of which opinions would have overruled St. Paul.'1 2 Although Justice
Owens' concurrence would have upheld SHB 3055 both on single-
subject and subject-in-title grounds," 3  Justice Sanders' dissent would
have rejected SHB 3055 as failing each of these tests. 1 4 Both opinions
agreed that St. Paul is contrary to the constitution's plain language:
"Clearly, the plain text of our Constitution does not differentiate between
'original' and 'amendatory' bills. There is no principled reason, and the
[plurality] offers none, to forego Article II, section 19 analysis simply
because one bill purports to amend another."
' 15
Justice Owens' Article II, section 19 analysis would have overruled
St. Paul for a number of reasons. First, the 1952 St. Paul decision was
inconsistent with the text of Article II, section 19: "By its plain language,
Article II, section 19 requires that any bill, whether original or amenda-
3 Wash. Terr. at 146.
110. State ex rel. Seattle Elec. Co. v. Superior Court, 28 Wash. 317, 325-26, 68 P. 957, 960-61
(1902) (emphasis supplied), cited in Fircrest, 158 Wash. 2d at 404, 143 P.3d at 786 (Owens, J.,
concurring); Fray v. Spokane County, 134 Wash. 2d 637, 654-55, 952 P.2d 601, 609-10 ("mere
reference to a section in the title of an act does not state a subject").
111. Seattle Elec. Co., 28 Wash. at 325-26, 68 P. at 960; see Patrice v. Murphy, 136 Wash. 2d
845, 853-55, 966 P.2d 1271, 1274-75 ("bare numerical reference" does not alert readers to content);
Fray, 134 Wash. 2d at 654-55, 952 P.2d at 609-10 (1998) (in act titled "technical corrections to ch.
35, laws of 1991," reference to section number in title does not state a subject); Cf Bennett v. State,
117 Wash. App. 483, 488, 70 P.3d 147, 150 (2003) (distinguishing Fray; title "implementing the
federal personal responsibility and work opportunity reconciliation act of 1996" was not a mere
reference to a numbered code section, but rather indicated its purpose of implementing a federal
law).
112. Fircrest, 158 Wash. 2d at 409, 143 P.3d at 787 (Owens, J., concurring); id. at 412 n. 1, 143
P.3d at 790 n.1 (Sanders, J., dissenting). In addition, both of these opinions objected to the plural-
ity's single-subject ruling. 158 Wash. 2d at 401, 406-07, 143 P.3d at 785, 788 (Owens, J., concur-
ring); 158 Wash. 2d at 411-13, n.I, 143 P.3d at 790-91, n.I (Sanders, J., dissenting).
113. Id. at 409, 143 P.3d at 789 (Owens, J., concurring).
114. Id. at 410-11, 143 P.3d at 790 (Sanders, J., dissenting).
115. Id. at 412 n.1, 143 P.3d at 790 n.l (Sanders, J., dissenting); Id. at 403, 143 P.3d at 786
(Owens, J., concurring) (citing dissent).
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tory, must embrace a single subject that is expressed in that bill's ti-
tle."' 16 For this reason, St. Paul was in conflict with the framers' views
at statehood and incorrect when decided.1 17 Further, St. Paul conflicted
with both prior and subsequent interpretations of Article II, section 19.118
After reviewing St. Paul's "meager offspring," the concurring justices
pointed out that St. Paul did not adequately explain how its own rule was
to be applied, as seen in the conflation of the single-subject and subject-
in-title tests in both the St. Paul progeny and the Fircrest plurality. 1 9
Notwithstanding the concurrence's dispute with the plurality on St.
Paul, the concurring justices agreed with the outcome of the title/subject
challenge. Justice Owens reasoned that the title "AN ACT Relating to
DUI tests" was general: "Although 'DUI' does refer to a specific statute,
the average citizen would interpret the acronym more broadly as a refer-
ence to alcohol-related driving offenses. 1 20 For this reason, the title en-
compassed and gave notice that the bill addressed "admissibility of tests
administered pursuant to alcohol-related driving offenses." Likewise,
because the component parts of SHB 3055 were related to the general
title and to each other though their direction toward uniform standards
for BAC tests, the bill met the single-subject test according to the con-
currence. 121
Writing for the dissent, Justice Sanders would have rejected SHB
3055 in its entirety under Article II, section 19.122 Although the dissent
would have overruled St. Paul as inconsistent with both the text of
Article II, section 19 and subsequent precedent, 123 the dissent's subject-
116. Id. at 403, 143 P.3d at 786 (Owens, J., concurring) (emphasis in original).
117. Id. at 403-05, 407-08, 143 P.3d at 786-87 (Owens, J., concurring).
118. Id. at 403-05, 407-08, 143 P.3d at 786-87 (Owens, J., concurring) (citing Price v. Ever-
green Cemetery Co., 57 Wash. 2d 352, 359, 357 P.2d 702, 705-06 (1960) (Finley, J., dissenting)
(criticizing majority for failure to follow St. Paul rule)).
119. Id. at 406-07, 143 P.3d at 787-88 (Owens, J., concurring). The concurrence explained
that the subject of a bill should be measured by its content-the title must express the subject, but
the title is not its test. Id. at 408 n.4, 143 P.3d at 789 n.4 (Owens, J., concurring).
120. Although Justice Owens did not directly cite Grange v. Locke for this proposition, her
conclusion is bolstered by that and similar cases in which the court interpreted titles under ordinary
understanding of the words and not as terms of art. Grange v. Locke, 153 Wash. 2d 474, 496-97,
105 P.3d 9, 20-21 (2005) ("qualifying primary" interpreted generically); Amalgamated Transit
Union v. State, 142 Wash. 2d 183, 217, 11 P.3d 762, 786 ("tax" carried its ordinary meaning, not the
initiative's broad definition); Petroleum Lease Props. Inc. v. Huse, 195 Wash. 254, 257-58, 80 P.2d
774, 775-76 (1938) (no indication that term "securities" in title included oil and gas leases).
121. Fircrest, 158 Wash. 2d at 408-09, 143 P.3d at 789 (Owens, J., concurring). The concur-
rence accepted the plurality's reasoning on the separation of powers and due process claims. Id. at
400, 143 P.3d at 784.
122. Id. at 410, 143 P.3d at 789 (Sanders, J., dissenting). The dissent also would have invali-
dated SHB 3055 as a legislative invasion of judicial powers. Id. at 417-21, 143 P.3d at 793-95
(Sanders, J., dissenting).
123. Id. at 411-13, n.I, 143 P.3d at 790-91, n.l (Sanders, J., dissenting).
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in-title analysis distinguished St. Paul and concluded that St. Paul did not
prohibit inquiry into the constitutionality of SHB 3055's title., 24 This
was because the title of SHB 3055 did not actually meet St. Paul's re-
quirement that the bill "identify and purport to amend a prior act,"' 125 as
SHB 3055's title "clearly" did not identify such an intent: "The majority
attempts to shoehorn SHB 3055 into the St. Paul framework by including
the recitation of the statutory provisions affected as part of its title, but
doing so runs afoul of the rule that constitutional inquiries focus solely
on the narrative description of the act."' 126 Since the St. Paul analysis did
not apply, the dissent went on to conclude that the narrative statement
"DUI tests" did not provide "an indication of the scope and purpose of
the law," because it failed to mention search warrants, breath test equip-
ment, implied consent warnings, or license sanctions.127 For this reason,
the dissent would have found the bill in violation of Article II, section
19's subject-in-title rule.
12
As with the concurrence, the dissent found no basis in the text of
the constitution for the plurality's use of St. Paul in a single-subject chal-
lenge, noting that
the Washington State Constitution does not provide, and we have
never held, a bill which impermissibly embraces more than one sub-
ject is nonetheless constitutional because its title, or the title of the
bill it purports to amend, somehow rectifies the violation.'
29
Moreover, notwithstanding the holdings of its progeny, St. Paul it-
self did not purport to apply to a single-subject analysis. 30 Using a ra-
tional unity analysis, the dissent would have invalidated the bill under the
single-subject rule. 131
IV. A LEGISLATIVE DRAFTER'S PERSPECTIVE ON FIRCREST
On first reading, legislative drafters might be tempted to minimize
the significance of Fircrest, given that a defacto majority of five justices
voted against resurrecting St. Paul. Yet there is good reason for concern
on the part of the legislature if the courts and future litigants fail to real-
ize that the plurality's reasoning is flawed both in its understanding of
124. Idat 417, 143 P.3d at 793 (Sanders, J., dissenting).
125. Idat 416-17, 143 P.3d at 793 (Sanders, J., dissenting) (citing St. Paul, 40 Wash. 2d 347,
355, 243 P.2d 474,479 (1952)).
126. Id. at 417, 143 P.3d at 793 (Sanders, J., dissenting) (emphasis applied).
127. Id. at 416-17, 143 P.3d at 793 (Sanders, J., dissenting).
128. Id.
129. Id. at 412, 143 P.3d at 790 (Sanders, J., dissenting).
130. Id at 413, 143 P.3d at 791 (Sanders, J., dissenting).
131. 158 Wash. 2d at 411-12, 143 P.3d at 790 (Sanders, J., dissenting).
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the legislative and judicial precedent and the purposes of the subject-in-
title rule and in its use of statutory evolution.
This Article brings a specifically legislative perspective to the dis-
cussion. In a long line of cases, the court declares that it-not the legisla-
ture, nor the governor-is the final arbiter of constitutional language and
interpretation, even when its view may be contrary to the view of the
constitution taken by the legislative or executive branches.1 32 Yet at the
same time the constitution assigns to the legislative branch the task of
fulfilling the subject-in-title requirement; the legislature must write bill
titles, and only the legislature may do so.133 Fircrest conflicts not only
with prior case law1 34 and the purposes of the subject-in-title rule, but
also with legislative implementation of Article II, section 19. This Arti-
cle argues that this conflict arises not from disagreements naturally aris-
ing among the branches regarding constitutional roles and interpreta-
tion 35 but instead through judicial misunderstanding of statutory evolu-
tion and the legislative process.
A. Legislative Use of Bill Titles Promotes
the Constitution's Purposes
In fulfilling its own constitutional responsibilities, the legislature at
all stages of the law-making process uses the subject matter statement in
the bill before the body as the relevant title for legal, parliamentary, and
policy analysis. This practice promotes the constitutional purpose of in-
forming legislators and the public of the subject placed before them by
the bill in question.'
36
First, in legislative practice, the substantive title of the bill before
the body, not of a previous act, is the operative title. Unlike the plurality
opinion in Fircrest, the state constitution and cases interpreting it do not
distinguish between "original" and "amendatory" titles or acts. Neither
do legislative rules and practices. 37 Notwithstanding some parliamen-
132. Seattle Sch. Dist. v. State, 90 Wash. 2d 476, 503-07, 585 P.2d 71, 86-89 (1978) (citing
Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (I Cranch) 137, 2 L.Ed. 60 (1803)).
133. See supra note 27 (ballot measure titles are exceptions).
134. See supra note 26 (judicial abandonment of St. Paul); supra notes 39-42 and accompany-
ing text (ministerial portion of title is not constitutionally substantive); supra notes 109-111 and
accompanying text (mere reference to section number in ministerial portion does not state a subject).
135. E.g., Legislature v. Lowry, 131 Wash. 2d 309, 320, 931 P.2d 885, 891 (1997) (court is
reluctant to be drawn into legislative-executive disputes about veto power, but will not "abandon our
constitutional responsibility to referee disputes between the branches."); In re Juvenile Dir., 87
Wash. 2d 232, 241, 552 P.2d 163, 168-69 (1976) (court claims power to order appropriations if
legislative branch fails to provide enough for its support).
136. See infra notes 163-68; supra notes 12, 14 (constitutional purposes).
137. Each body adopts rules that govern its own practices. WASH. CONST. art. II, § 9; House
Resolution 4607 (Wash. 2007) (House rules); Engrossed Senate Resolution 8601 (Wash. 2007)
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tary differences138 between the House and Senate, both legislative bodies
focus on the subject matter statement in the title of the bill before the
body, not the title of any previous legislation.
Nothing in legislative rules or practices recognizes the concept of
an "amendatory title."' 39 The legislature distinguishes between amenda-
tory bills and bills consisting of new sections only as needed to comply
with Article II, section 37's requirement that amended sections be set
forth in full. 140  Amendatory sections must refer to the affected code or
session law section number and set forth amendatory changes in a spe-
cific format, but the rules do not establish any separate requirements for
titles of amendatory acts.141 The legislature makes no further distinctions
between bills that create new sections and bills that make the first, the
second, or the twentieth revision to an existing section.
In addition to serving constitutional purposes, bill titles reflect leg-
islators' policy and parliamentary objectives and may be drawn accord-
ingly. 42  Legislators may draft a narrow title to accomplish a targeted
purpose143 or to fend off unfriendly amendments, 44 or they may draft a
(Senate rules). See generally Fraser, supra note 6, at 459-60. In addition, the House and the Senate
together adopt joint rules. House Concurrent Resolution 8400 (Wash. 2007) (joint rules).
138. See supra notes 35-37 and accompanying text (House and Senate rules and practices on
title amendments).
139. 158 Wash. 2d at 391, 143 P.3d at 780 ("amendatory title").
140. WASH. STATE SENATE RULE 26 (2007) (setting forth text of art. II, § 37); WASH. STATE
HOUSE RULE 11(F) ("No act shall ever be revised or amended without being set forth at full
length.") (2007).
A further parliamentary distinction regarding amendatory sections may be required, if applica-
ble, to determine whether a bill is an amendment to a ballot measure so as to require a two-thirds
vote under article I, section I's restrictions. See Senate Journal at 377 (Wash. 2005) (parliamentary
ruling that section revised by Initiative 872 requires two-thirds vote to amend); Senate Journal at
1550 (Wash. 2003) (parliamentary ruling that incidental amendment to section amended by initiative
did not require two-thirds vote). See generally Fraser, supra note 6, at 456, 471-74.
141. WASH. STATE LEGIS. JOINT RULES 12-13 (2007) (requiring section number and specific
formatting for amendatory changes); WASH. STATE SENATE RULE 26 (2007); WASH. STATE HOUSE
RULE 11 (F) (2007). See supra note 70 and accompanying text (regarding "jingles" for amendatory
sections).
142. Often there are many options available for titles to a particular measure, and the President
is mindful that there are legal, policy, and political reasons for preferring one set of language to
another. The President will give great deference to the title chosen by a member or the body for a
bill. Senate Journal 455 (Wash. 2006) (ruling on subject-in-title challenge under Senate Rule 25)
("[T]he legislature may adopt just as comprehensive a title as it sees fit, and if such title when taken
by itself relates to a unified subject or object, it is good, however much such unified subject is capa-
ble of division .... The generality of a title is no objection to it, so long as it is not made a cover to
legislation incongruous in itself and which by no fair intendment can be considered as having a
necessary or proper connection."). Marston v. Humes, 3 Wash. 267, 276, 28 P. 520, 523 (1891)
(citations and internal quotations omitted) (citing THOMAS COOLEY, CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS
144 (5th ed. 1883)).
143. Examples of extraordinarily narrow titles are found in 2006 Wash. Sess. Laws ch. 122
(26-line title) and in 2007 Wash. Sess. Laws ch. 483 (ESSB 6157) (60-line title).
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broad title to address diverse but connected and complementary issues in
omnibus legislation. 45 Regardless of the title's scope, the legislature's
implementation of Article II, section 19 ensures that the title contains a
substantive statement of the bill's subject. If the bill as enacted satisfies
constitutional requirements, the enrolled bill doctrine prevents the court
from second-guessing the legislature's choice of title; it is not the role of
the court to re-draft a title by enlarging what the legislature has seen fit to
limit 46 nor by narrowing a title drafted broadly by the legislature. 147 For
this reason, Fircrest incorrectly considered the title of legislation enacted
more than forty years previously rather than the title of SHB 3055 as en-
acted by the fifty-eighth legislature.
Second, in legislative practice the portions of a bill title beyond the
statement of subject matter are "ministerial" only and never state a sub-
stantive subject. The legislature is free to include these "housekeeping"
144. See supra notes 28-31 and accompanying text. "Restrictive titles are generally avoided,
unless a sponsor's strategy is to avoid amendments." BILL DRAFTING GUIDE, supra note 17, at 8.
Scope and object rules limit the amendments that legislators may offer to a bill. WASH. STATE
SENATE RULE 66 and WASH. STATE HOUSE RULE 11(E). Such rules prohibit amendments that
"change the scope and object of the bill." These rules echo article II, section 38 of the state constitu-
tion, which states that "[n]o amendment shall be allowed which shall change the scope and object of
the bill." Id. Although this requirement is an independent constitutional provision, the scope and
object requirement also implements both the single-subject rule (by preventing addition of subjects)
and the subject-in-title rule (by requiring amendments to be germane). See Fed'n of State Employ-
ees v. State, 127 Wash. 2d 544, 570 n.5, 901 P.2d 1028, 1041 (Talmadge, J., concurring and dissent-
ing) (describing prevention of logrolling); see also SEEBERGER, supra note 42, at 20 (title/subject
and scope and object rules overlap, but "the scope and object provision generally applies more to the
amendatory process").
The two legislative bodies appear to use bill titles differently in a scope and object analysis,
presumably because the Senate may amend the substance of a title and the House may not. See
supra notes 35-38 and accompanying text (rules and practices on title amendments). Compare
Senate Journal 529 (Wash. 1999) (body of act, rather than title, determines scope and object) and
Senate Journal 703 (Wash. 1997) (if amendments are within scope and object of bill, title may be
amended) with House Journal 357-58 (Wash. 1995) (title considered in scope and object analysis).
The enrolled bill doctrine may bar judicial enforcement of article II, section 38. Power, Inc., v.
Huntley, 39 Wash. 2d 191, 204, 235 P.2d 173, 180-81 (1951); see Fraser, supra note 6, at 475 &
n.253 (title considered in scope and object analysis; relationship with enrolled bill doctrine).
145. E.g., In re Boot, 130 Wash. 2d 555, 566, 925 P.2d 964, 966 (1996) (upholding title of
omnibus act relating to "violence prevention"); State v. Jenkins, 68 Wash. App. 897, 900-01, 847
P.2d 488, 489-90 (1993), review denied, 121 Wash. 2d 1032 (upholding title of omnibus act relating
to "alcohol and controlled substances abuse").
146. In making a parliamentary ruling on the sufficiency of a title, the "challenge for the [pre-
siding officer] is to adequately recognize the title protection afforded by Rule 25 [Senate title/subject
rule] while refraining from simply substituting his judgment for that of the drafters." Senate Journal
455 (Wash. 2006); see Gruen v. Tax Comm'n, 35 Wash. 2d 1, 23, 211 P.2d 651,644 (1949) (legisla-
ture has ability to limit breadth of title); cf Grange v. Locke, 153 Wash. 2d 475, 491, 496-97 105
P.3d 9, 18, 20-21 (2005) (court interprets words in title per ordinary definition, not as terms of art).
147. Cf Batey v. Employment Sec. Div., 137 Wash. App. 506, 513, 154 P.3d 266, 270
amended, reconsideration granted petition for review filed, June 15, 2007, (phrase in title "to en-
hance benefit and tax equity" deemed restrictive).
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lists, to revise them, or omit them entirely, because these technical decla-
rations appear as a legislative custom, not as a constitutional mandate.
48
The relevant title for a constitutional inquiry is the subject matter state-
ment before the first semicolon, and other material in the title is "surplu-
sage" that is not constitutionally required.14 9  Supporting the legislative
practice of treating this material as ministerial only is a substantial body
of case law declaring, contrary to Fircrest, that mere incidental reference
to a section number in a bill title can never, in itself, state a subject. 5 °
The Fircrest plurality reasoned that the references to the code numbers
of individual sections in the ministerial portion of the title declared a pur-
pose to amend Title 46,151 but the Fircrest plurality is incorrect in assum-
ing that reference to a section number in the technical part of a bill title
in itself may state a substantive subject.
In addition to conflicting with the purposes of the title-subject rule
and legislative practices, Fircrest and St. Paul will frustrate legal analy-
sis of bill titles during the legislative process. The legislature must inter-
pret and apply the subject-in-title requirement in conducting its ordinary
constitutional duties. This requirement influences the drafting of every
bill, along with every proposed amendment and substitute bill, and many
such proposals require specific legal or parliamentary analysis under its
148. BILL DRAFTING GUIDE, supra note 13, at 8; see supra notes 39-42 and accompanying text
(ministerial title drafted through legislative custom, not constitutional requirement).
149. See State v. Thomas, 103 Wash. App. 800, 808-09, 14 P.3d 854, 859-60 (2000) (title is
"narrative description" in phrase following "AN ACT Relating to" and preceding the first semicolon,
not "ministerial" recitation of bill sections, which is "surplusage"); Patrice v. Murphy, 136 Wash.
2d 845, 853-55, 966 P.2d 1271, 1274-75 (1998) (analyzing phrase before first semicolon); Flanders
v. Morris, 88 Wash. 2d 183, 188, 558 P.2d 769, 773 (1977) (title need not be an "index"); Wash.
Fed'n of State Employees v. State, 127 Wash. 2d 544, 557, 901 P.2d 1028, 1035 (1995) (title need
not specifically express that repealers are included); Maxwell v. Lancaster, 81 Wash. 602, 607, 143
P. 157, 158 (1914) (under a title relating to a general subject, the legislature may repeal existing laws
as well as create new ones); Bennett v. State, 117 Wash. 2d 483, 488-90, 70 P.3d 147, 150-51
(2003) (analyzing phrase before first semicolon); see also BILL DRAFTING GUIDE, supra note 13, at
8 (citing cases).
150. Patrice v. Murphy, 136 Wash. 2d 845, 853-55, 966 P.2d 1271, 1274-75 (1998) ("bare
numerical reference" does not alert readers to content); Fray v. Spokane County, 134 Wash. 2d 637,
654-55, 952 P.2d 601, 609-10 (1998) (in AART "technical corrections to ch. 35, laws of 1991,"
reference to section number in title does not state a subject); State ex rel. Seattle Elec. Co. v. Supe-
rior Court, 28 Wash. 317, 325-26, 68 P. 957, 960-61 (1902) (mere reference to a section number
does not state a subject); Harland v. Territory, 3 Wash. Terr. 131, 146, 13 P. 453 (1887) ("The ex-
pression of a purpose to amend a particular section of the Code gives it to be understood that the law
is to be changed; but what the law that is to be changed, and in what respect it is to be changed, is a
matter left entirely in the dark"); cf Bennett v. State, 117 Wash. App. 483, 488, 70 P.3d 147, 150
(2003) (distinguishing Fray; title "implementing the federal personal responsibility and work oppor-
tunity reconciliation act of 1996" was not a mere reference to a numbered code section, but rather
indicated its purpose of implementing a federal law).
151. City of Fircrest v. Jensen, 158 Wash. 2d 384, 393, 143 P.3d 776, 781 (2006).
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terms.152 The House and the Senate must constantly balance the need to
comply with constitutional drafting constraints, as interpreted in judicial
and parliamentary rulings, with legislators' policy and political objec-
tives in offering legislation. 53 As previously noted, the courts are facing
increasing numbers of challenges under the title/subject rule of Article II,
section 19, triggering more analyses at the judicial level. 54 Yet for every
such challenge that reaches a courtroom, legislators and legislative attor-
neys will have engaged in hundreds of formal and informal subject-in-
title analyses while the bills are still at the Capitol. 155 For example, if a
bill is entitled "AN ACT Relating to liquor sales" and a legislator would
like to offer an amendment relating to salaries of state liquor store em-
ployees, the presiding officer or committee chair may be asked for a par-
liamentary ruling on whether it is in order for the body or the committee
to consider the amendment. The amendment's sponsor may ask a staff
attorney for advice on the likely outcome of such a parliamentary inquiry
or on whether the bill if amended would be upheld in court, and an op-
ponent may ask for an opinion on whether those particular topics may be
included in a single bill regardless of the bill's title. The title/subject rule
informs every such analysis and decision.
In conducting these analyses, legislators, parliamentarians, and leg-
islative drafters rely on the subject matter statement in the title of the in-
dividual bill in question. During a litigated dispute, the parties and the
court may be able to research exhaustively the history of a specific sec-
tion, but if legislators were required to investigate the titles of prior acts
to determine whether an amendment or substitute bill introduced a sub-
ject beyond the bill's title, floor action would grind to a halt as staff at-
torneys reviewed the historical antecedents of each amendatory section
in the bill, any one of which could have dozens of legislative "ances-
,,156tors. Instead, the legislature uses the much simpler approach of rely-
ing on the subject matter statement in the title of the bill itself. This
straightforward analysis is necessitated by the myriad demands of the
legislative session. For example, in the 2005 and 2006 sessions, the 59th
Legislature drafted 12,728 bills, memorials, and resolutions, considered a
total of 4671 measures and thousands of amendments thereto, and en-
152. See infra note 192 and accompanying text (number of bill drafts); Fraser, supra note 6, at
459 & n.94 (relationship between parliamentary analysis and subsequent judicial review).
153. See supra note 146 (presiding officer's goal in parliamentary rulings); notes 29, 30,
141-143 and accompanying text. (objectives).
154. See supra note 6 and accompanying text.
155. This statement is based on this author's experience.
156. See supra note 56 and infra notes 191-93 and accompanying text (sections may be
amended multiple times, under multiple titles, for multiple purposes).
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acted 891 acts in a total of 164 legislative days. 157  As Harland asked
before statehood, if legislators are too busy to read the full text of every
law they must vote upon, is it not even more futile to expect them to read
previous legislation in order to determine whether to vote on the legisla-
tion currently before them? 58 Under Fircrest, it would be nigh impossi-
ble for a legislator to determine a bill's true title for purposes of the sub-
ject-in-title rule in ordinary legislative work.
The Fircrest plurality also misunderstands the legislative process in
its puzzling statement that when amending "an original act, it is unneces-
sary to examine the amendatory title for strict compliance with Article II,
section 19, because the underlying act has already passed such scru-
tiny."15 9 While all legislation is entitled to a presumption of constitution-
ality,1 60 and in the Senate a bill that allegedly violates the constitutional
title/subject rule is subject to parliamentary challenge, 61 the absence of a
parliamentary or legal challenge is not constitutional "scrutiny."' 162 It is
emphatically not the case that each "original act" will have survived ju-
dicial review before that act's "progeny" are subject to challenge. Again,
the demands of the legislative session mean that legislative analysis of a
title/subject question must not require legislators and their legal staff to
research the entire legislative history of every section of every bill in
order to determine whether prior acts were or were not the focus of a ju-
dicial title/subject ruling.
157. Information provided by the Office of the Code Reviser.
158. Harland v. Territory, 3 Wash. Terr. 131, 147, 13 P. 453, 459 (1887).
If legislators are too busy or too negligent to have read in full or to read laws on which
they must vote, how vain to expect them to read laws which the laws they are to vote are
to affect, with the sole purpose of determining therefrom whether it is worthwhile to read
the laws on which they are to vote?
dat 147, 13 P. at 459; see Senate Journal 455 (Wash. 2006) (sheer number of bills causes readers to
rely on bill titles); Philip A. Talmadge, A New Approach to Statutory Construction in Washington,
25 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 179, 186-87 n.37 (discussing "Busy Congress" model and need for legisla-
tors to rely on the expertise of colleagues: "it is a common and acceptable practice to vote based on
the advice of others rather than personal knowledge about the contents of bills .... Voting based on
advice rather than personal knowledge is a common and perfectly appropriate way of managing
massive decision making responsibilities.").
159. City of Fircrest v. Jensen, 158 Wash. 2d 384, 391, 143 P.3d 776, 780 (emphasis added).
In Belancsik v. Overlake Mem'l Hosp., 80 Wash. 2d 111, 114-15,492 P.2d 219, 220-21 (1971), one
of the St. Paul progeny, the "original act" had indeed been judicially upheld against an article II,
section 19 challenge. In re Estate of Wiltermood, 78 Wash. 2d 238, 472 P.2d 536 (1970).
160. E.g., Island County v. State, 135 Wash. 2d 141, 146-47, 955 P.2d 377, 379-80 (1998).
161. WASH. STATE SENATE RULE 25, see supra note 36 (Senate parliamentary rulings).
162. Even if a bill's title had been challenged on title/subject grounds and upheld in a parlia-
mentary ruling, that ruling does not prevent a court from reaching a different conclusion in its consti-
tutional analysis. Compare Senate Journal, 32d Leg. Ex. Session 68 (Wash. 1951) (Senate president
rejected a bill in a parliamentary ruling under the Senate's title subject rule; this ruling was overrid-
den by the Senate and the bill passed), with Power, Inc. v. Huntley, 39 Wash. 2d 191, 198-99, 235
P.2d 173, 178 (1951) (invalidating same legislation on article I1, section 19 grounds).
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B. Fircrest and St. Paul Thwart the Legislative Purposes
of the Subject-in-Title Rule
In addition to frustrating legislative implementation of the subject-
in-title rule, the "original act" analysis used by Fircrest and St. Paul runs
contrary to the rule's purposes of protecting legislators against undis-
closed subjects and informing legislators and the public of the legisla-
tion's subject matter.
163
1. Fircrest Conflicts with the Purposes
of the Subject-in-Title Rule
In a legislative setting, the importance of a title in providing effec-
tive notice cannot be underestimated. As Harland noted just before
statehood, busy legislators rely on bill titles for notice of a bill's subject
matter:
In theory, legislators inform themselves carefully and laboriously of
the effect of the laws on which they vote. In practice, they do not.
Laws are often passed by their titles alone. They are very rarely re-
ferred to in publications, official or otherwise, prior to their passage,
except by their titles. Knowing this fact and accepting it, and with
the design of making the best of it, our constitution makers gave
their mandate, intending to obviate as far as possible the evils re-
sulting from this lax way of doing business. 16
4
Little has changed. As previously noted, each legislature considers
thousands of bills and amendments.165 This sheer volume of legislative
work and the constitutionally compressed 166 time frame in which it must
be accomplished demand that legislators be able to rely on the title of a
bill itself for notice of its subject matter. 1
67
163. E.g., State ex rel. Toll Bridge Auth. v. Yelle, 32 Wash. 2d 13, 24, 200 P.2d 467, 472-73
(1948); see Harland v. Territory, 3 Wash. Terr. 131, 145, 13 P. 453, 458 (1887) (citing COOLEY,
supra note 12).
164. Harland, 3 Wash. Terr. at 147, 13 P. at 459.
165. See infra note 157 and accompanying text.
166. Regular sessions are limited to 105 days in odd-numbered years and 60 days in even-
numbered years. WASH. CONST. art. II, § 12.
167. In Grange v. Locke, the governor argued that the purposes of the subject-in-title require-
ment apply only during the actual legislative process to provide notice to legislators and members of
the public of "what is contained in proposed new laws." Brief of Respondent at 33-34, Grange v.
Locke, 153 Wash. 2d 474, 105 P.3d 9 (2005) (emphasis in original). Hence, such purposes are ful-
filled once both houses of the legislature have passed the bill, and the act is delivered to the governor
for approval or veto. For this reason, argued Governor Locke, the rule cannot be applied to a veto.
Id. The Grange court did not reach the issue. Id. at 498-99, 105 P.3d at 22. An older case indicates
that the subject-in-title rule does indeed bind the governor in the use of the veto power. Spokane
Grain & Fuel v. Lyttaker, 59 Wash. 76, 85-86, 109 P. 316, 320 (1910) ("In the exercise of the veto
power, the executive can have no greater power than the executive and the legislature combined, yet
[Vol. 31:35
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According to a parliamentary ruling of the Lieutenant Governor,
who serves as the President of the Senate, a bill's title must provide no-
tice of its subject matter:
[T]he purpose of the title requirement [is] to provide some form of
notice to the members and the public of the subject matter of each
bill. The volume of legislation introduced each Session is signifi-
cant, and the sheer number of bills makes it challenging for anyone
to read each measure in full. The title provides a shorthand method
for a reader to quickly discern the issues and law being affected by a
bill to determine if the measure concerns policy of interest to the
reader. In this way, someone interested in liquor licenses, for ex-
ample, could be assured that a measure entitled, "AN ACT relating
to vehicle licensing subagents" does not modify alcohol statutes. It
is important, therefore, that the title be accurate as well as concise.
It does not require that the title be perfectly precise, but it should
adequately describe the scope and purpose of the law being changed
so as to cause a reader following a particular issue to determine if
further inquiry into the text of the bill is necessary.'68
Allowing the title of an "original act" to serve as the title of a sub-
sequent "amendatory" act frustrates the constitutional purposes of notice
and disclosure. A bill that complies with the rule by disclosing its sub-
ject on its face either lets a legislator or citizen know the bill's subject at
first glance or informs the reader that further investigation is required.
169
By relying on the title of earlier legislation, the Fircrest plurality elimi-
nated the requirement that an amendatory bill's title contain a substantive
disclosure of the bill's subject matter. This use of an "original title"
would validate hidden subjects and render irrelevant the title of the bill
being voted upon. "0
if the Legislature had enacted the law in question, in the form in which it left the executive office,
there could be no question as to its invalidity [under the subject-in-title rule]."); see Fraser, supra
note 6, at 459-60.
Washington courts have yet to address whether the governor may use the veto to bring an act
into compliance with either the single-subject or subject-in-title, if the act was in violation when it
was passed by the legislature. Cf 2007 Wash. Sess. Laws ch. 338 (in veto message, the governor
noted that the title did not encompass the vetoed section.); 2007 Wash. Sess. Laws ch. 340 (same).
168. Senate Journal 455 (Wash. 2006) (presiding officer's ruling on subject-in-title challenge
under Senate Rule 25).
169. E.g., Grange v. Locke, 153 Wash. 2d 475, 498, 105 P.3d 9, 21-22 (2005) ("voter or legis-
lator reading the title ... for the first time"); YMCA v. State, 62 Wash. 2d 504, 506, 383 P.2d 497,
498-99 (1963) ("lead to an inquiry... or indicate to an inquiring mind").
170. See City of Fircrest v. Jensen, 158 Wash. 2d 384, 405, 143 P.3d 776, 787 (2006) (Owens,
J., concurring) (The Fircrest plurality reduces descriptive title in an amendatory act to
"surplusage."). Further, the plurality's apparent reliance on St. Paul to resolve the single-subject
challenge could lead drafters to believe a broad title-whether an "original" or "amendatory" title-
could cure a single-subject error, when in reality a bill's subject must be judged by whether its sub-
2007]
Seattle University Law Review
For example, under the plurality's reasoning, the legislature could
include in "AN ACT Relating to murder" amendatory sections relating to
both murder and theft, but argue that the subject-in-title rule is satisfied
because the code sections dealing with theft and murder were "origi-
nally" enacted in a 1975 law titled "AN ACT Relating to crimes and
criminal procedure."' 71 Similarly, in the Lieutenant Governor's example
of a bill entitled "AN ACT Relating to vehicle licensing subagents," if
the bill also contained provisions relating to liquor licenses on the theory
that an "original act" contained provisions relating to all types of licens-
ing, then published legislative agendas would not inform a citizen con-
cerned about proximity of taverns to schools that "further investigation"
is required. 72 In turn, she would neither be alerted to testify at a legisla-
tive hearing nor to lobby committee members or her own district legisla-
tors. A legislator who relied on the bill title to vote for the bill would not
know that he was potentially affecting the budget for the Liquor Control
Board, liquor licensing fees paid by his local businesses, or his neighbor-
hood entrepreneur's ability to open a new restaurant. These results
would defeat the constitution's purpose of disclosing a bill's subject mat-
ter to legislators and the public.
2. Could Fircrest be Used "Offensively"
to Invalidate Legislation?
Another question is whether the Fircrest reasoning could be used
"offensively" in attempts to invalidate legislation. The plurality used an
original act's broad title to uphold subsequent legislation with a narrower
title. But would the reverse be true? If the sections in SSB 3055 ("AN
ACT Relating to admissibility of DUI tests") 73 were subsequently
amended by "AN ACT Relating to motor vehicle offenses," and the latter
act addressed not only offenses involving vehicles and intoxicants, but
also other vehicular crimes or infractions, could the earlier act's narrower
title invalidate the broader contents of the amendatory act? Sections may
be repeatedly amended under multiple titles, 74 and if a broad amenda-
tory title happens to follow a narrow amendatory title, the Fircrest plu-
parts bear it and each other a "rational unity," not whether the title is drafted so broadly that it en-
compasses all of them. See supra note 119 (title must express subject, but title is not its test).
171. Laws of 1975, 1st Ex. Sess. ch. 260. This outcome also encourages logrolling and viola-
tions of the single-subject rule, because undisclosed subjects could well be second subjects.
172. E.g., Grange v. Locke, 153 Wash. 2d 475, 498, 105 P.3d 9, 21-22 (2005) ("voter or legis-
lator reading the title ... for the first time"); YMCA v. State, 62 Wash. 2d 504, 506, 383 P.2d 497,
498-99 (1963) ("lead to an inquiry... or indicate to an inquiring mind").
173. 2004 Wash. Sess. Laws ch. 68.
174. See supra note 56 and infra notes 191-94 and accompanying text (regarding subsequent
amendatory titles).
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rality opinion, along with some of the St. Paul progeny, would seem to
support this "offensive" use of its holding to invalidate subsequent
amendatory legislation.'75
3. Fircrest Extends Subject-in-Title Analysis
Beyond the Text of the Bill
In addition to conflicting with the purposes of Article II, section 19,
the Fircrest plurality opinion also invades the legislative process by fo-
cusing on history and procedure rather than the ultimately enacted legis-
lation. Judicial use of legislative history in a constitutional analysis un-
der Article II, section 19 flouts both the enrolled bill doctrine and the
constitutional purposes of the subject-in-title rule.
From the legislative perspective, the enrolled bill doctrine is a pillar
of separation of powers principles, one that supports those principles by
preventing judicial incursions into the legislative process. 176 Under this
doctrine, an enrolled bill on file in the office of the secretary of state,
signed by the officers of both houses as required by Article II, section 32
of the constitution and otherwise fair on its face, is conclusive evidence
of the regularity of all proceedings necessary for its enactment in accor-
dance with the constitution's procedural requirements.1 77 Unless an en-
rolled bill "carries its death warrant in its hand,"'1 78 an "investigation of
the antecedent history of the passage of a bill will not be made except as
may be necessary in case of ambiguity in the bill when the legislative
intent must be determined., 179 In other words, the enrolled bill doctrine
permits the court to review legislative history, such as floor debate' 8° or
175. Goodnoe Hills Sch. Dist. v. Forry, 52 Wash. 2d 868, 873-74, 329 P.2d 1083, 1085-86
(1958) (powers granted in the 1955 law could have been granted in the 1953 law); Keeting v. PUD
No. 1, 49 Wash. 2d 761, 763-64, 306 P.2d 762, 762 (1957) (general title of 1953 law was sufficient
to include the annexation feature found in the 1955 law). Even some language in Harland, which
generally rejects the reasoning used in Fircrest, would seem to support this result:
Scattered throughout the reports and text-books are many cases holding that the incorpo-
ration in the title of the amendatory or repealing act of the title of the act to be amended
or repealed is a sufficient compliance with the constitutional requirement. This is
undoubtedly true, and it is true because the subject of an amendatory act is required in all
cases to be germane and congruous to the general object of the original act which it
affects, and to recite the title of the original act in the title of the amendatory act is to
express the subject of the amendment in the amendatory act.
Harland, 3 Wash. Terr. at 460 (emphasis added).
176. Citizens Council v. Bjork, 84 Wash. 2d 891, 897 n.l, 529 P.2d 1072, 1076 (1975); see Op.
Atty. Gen. No. 10 (1965-66); Fraser, supra note 6, at 456-58.
177. Citizens Council, 84 Wash. 2d at 897 n.1, 529 P.2d at 1076.
178. State ex rel. Dunbar v. State Bd. of Equalization, 140 Wash. 433, 249 P. 996 (1926).
179. Citizens Council, 84 Wash. 2d at 897 n.l, 529 P.2d at 1076.
180. Fed'n of State Employees v. State, 98 Wash. 2d 677, 685, 658 P.2d 634, 638 (1983); cf
CLEAN v. State, 130 Wash. 2d 782, 810, 928 P.3d 1054, 1067-68 (1996) (using floor debate to
uphold declaration in emergency clause).
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sequential drafts,' 8' when the court must discern legislative intent in or-
der to interpret an ambiguous statute,1 82 but the court is otherwise prohib-
ited from considering the legislative processes that led to enactment of
the law.' 83
Notwithstanding the enrolled bill doctrine, judicial use of legisla-
tive history has crept into constitutional subject-in-title analyses.
184
These opinions' recitation of legislative history 85 reveals judicial distrust
of legislative procedures and parliamentary maneuvering: "A court's de-
scription of the legislative procedure leading to passage of the bill at is-
181. E.g., Howlett v. Cheetham, 17 Wash. 626, 632, 50 P.522, 524 (1897); Bellevue Fire
Fighters Local 1604 v. Bellevue, 100 Wash. 2d 748, 753, 675 P.2d 593, 596 (1984); cf Hama Hama
v. Shorelines Hearings Bd., 85 Wash. 2d 441, 450, 536 P.2d 157, 162-63 (1975) (when sequential
drafts should not be used).
182. Where a statute is unambiguous, its meaning must be derived from its text only, and the
court need not resort to an investigation of legislative history. E.g., Marquis v. City of Spokane, 130
Wash. 2d 97, 107, 922 P.2d 43, 49 (1996). Ambiguity exists if a statute is open to more than one
reasonable interpretation. E.g., Vashon Island Comm. for Self-Government v. Wash. State Bound-
ary Review Bd., 127 Wash. 2d 759, 771, 903 P.2d 953 (1995).
183. "The court may resort to [legislative history] to ascertain legislative intent where a statute
is ambiguous or its meaning is doubtful or obscure, but we will not go behind an enrolled document
to determine the method, the procedure, the means or the manner by which it was passed in both
houses of the legislature." State ex rel. Bugge v. Martin, 28 Wash. 2d 834, 840-41, 232 P.2d 833,
836-37 (1951).
184. In Patrice, the court noted that the material rejected as outside the title resulted from the
grafting of a second bill onto court cost legislation as an eleventh-hour amendment. Patrice v. Mur-
phy, 136 Wash. 2d 845, 966 P.2d 1271 (1998). Likewise, in Batey, the court explained that the
provisions outside the title resulted from a striking amendment that stripped all substantive provi-
sions from another bill, even though the title was drafted broadly ("making adjustments in the unem-
ployment insurance system to enhance benefit and tax equity"). Batey v. Employment Sec. Dept.,
137 Wash. App. 506, 511-12, 154 P.3d 266, 268-69 (2007), amended, 2007 Wash. App. LEXIS
1244, Laws of 2006, ch. 2, petition for review filed, June 15, 2007. A striking amendment, as its
name indicates, strikes all material from the bill after the title and the enacting clause and replaces it
with provisions that are entirely new to the bill. See SEEBERGER, supra note 42, at 67, 239. Striking
amendments are subject to challenge under parliamentary rules pertaining to scope and object, see
supra note 144, but so long as the text and title of the bill as enacted satisfies the title-subject rule,
the procedural use of a striking amendment is irrelevant to the title/subject constitutional analysis.
For example, if a bill entitled "AN ACT Relating to liquor" were amended to strike provisions that
restricted access to liquor and insert provisions allowing greater access to liquor, no violation of the
subject-in-title rule results. Such an amendment might be vulnerable to a parliamentary scope and
objection, but not a legal challenge under article II, section 19.
Conversely, in Thomas the court relied on the absence of legislative history describing addi-
tions to a bill to find that those portions of the bill fell outside of its title. State v. Thomas, 103
Wash. App. 810, 14 P.3d 854 (2000) (in "AN ACT Relating to insurance fraud," bill reports, com-
mittee discussions, and final legislative reports did not discuss the bill's effect on criminal profiteer-
ing statutes).
185. Patrice, 136 Wash. 2d at 849-51, 855, 966 P.2d, 175-76; Batey v. State, 137 Wash. App.
506, 511-13, 154 P.3d 266, 268-69 (2007); Thomas, 103 Wash. App. at 806, 810, 14 P.3d at 860.
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sue sometimes indicates that the court's willingness to overturn the law
is based on the suspicion that the process was tainted.'
86
Such judicial speculation has no place in a constitutional analysis.
Under the enrolled bill doctrine, the court's sole focus in an Article II,
section 19 inquiry must be found within the four corners of the enrolled
bill itself. Again, Article II, section 19 requires that "No bill shall em-
brace more than one subject, and that shall be expressed in its title." The
text of this section does not invite the court to speculate on whether a
late-breaking amendment added material outside the bill's title, or
whether a striking amendment with different content relating to a bill's
subject matter belatedly hijacked 187 a conveniently broad bill title. In-
stead, the court must focus on the text of the constitutional requirement:
does the bill contain material not embraced by the title's subject matter
statement, regardless of whether the material was added by last-minute
amendment or was present from the first draft of the bill? Article II, sec-
tion 19 places this focus on the bill's text and title, not on the bill's pro-
cedural history or legislative antecedents. 88  The enrolled bill doctrine
correctly forces the court to scrutinize the final legislative product with-
out speculating on the prior legislation, the politics, or the processes that
led to the end result.
In its use of an "original act" in a constitutional analysis, Fircrest
represents such a judicial breach of the enrolled bill doctrine. The "origi-
nal act" relied upon by Fircrest's plurality is not within the four corners
of SHB 3055. 89 Fircrest looked to SHB 3055's legislative ancestors not
to determine the meaning of SHB 3055's statutory provisions (a use of
legislative history permitted by the enrolled bill doctrine if the statute is
186. Dragich, supra note 6, at 108-09. In addition to using legislative history in a subject-in-
title analysis, courts have also improperly used a bill's background in constitutional analysis under
the single-subject rule. State Legislature v. State, 139 Wash. 2d 129, 147, 985 P.2d 353, 363 (using
legislative history as a criterion for determining whether budget bill violated single-subject rule by
impermissibly including "substantive law"); Flanders v. Morris, 88 Wash. 2d 183, 186, 558 P.2d
769, 772 (1977) (same; "Tracing the history of the above quoted provision, we find that it epitomizes
the very type of legislation that the two cited constitutional provisions [article 11, section 19 and
article 11, section 37] were designed to protect against"). See also Fraser, supra note 6, at 468-69.
187. BILL DRAFTING GUIDE, supra note 13, at 50-51; SEEBERGER, supra note 42, at 67, 239
(striking amendments). This practice was formerly known as "scalping" a bill. See supra note 144
(parliamentary and constitutional scope and object requirements limit amendments, including strik-
ing amendments).
188. In contrast, other Washington constitutional provisions expressly require the legislature
and the courts to consider new legislation against the background of prior laws, and scrutiny of this
background does not violate the enrolled bill doctrine. Article II, section 37 requires amended sec-
tions to be set forth in full, and article II, sections 1 and 41 restrict amendment of ballot measures
within two years of their enactment.
189. Again, references to section numbers in the ministerial portion of the bill title do not de-
clare a substantive subject. See supra notes 110-111.
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ambiguous) but to salvage its constitutionality in a manner not contem-
plated by the text of the constitutional provision. When considering SHB
3055 as enacted by the 58th Legislature, the court should have analyzed
that act individually under the subject-in-title rule, without regard to ti-
tles selected by previous legislatures for prior, separate legislation. The
Fircrest plurality's examination of prior legislative acts diverts judicial
attention away from the bill at issue in a manner that conflicts with the
text and thwarts the purposes of Article II, section 19.
C. Identifying the "Original Act" in the Legislative
Family Tree may be Impossible
In following St. Paul and its "meager offspring," the Fircrest plu-
rality did not fully understand the difficulty, if not the outright futility, of
identifying the "original act" in question. The plurality failed to grasp
how statutory evolution through the legislative amendment process
makes it difficult to identify an "original act" for a statutory section with
any history of amendment. Repeated amendments of the same sections
of law, under different titles, for different purposes, make it futile to trace
the "title" pedigree of any particular section. In its efforts to uphold SHB
3055 by trying to trace the bill's sections to their "original act," the Fir-
crest plurality instead broadened bill titles-broadened them not only
beyond St. Paul's precedent but even further in a manner not adequately
understood by the plurality.
1. Firerest Expands St. Paul's "Original Act" Precedent
to Sections with Numerous Statutory "Ancestors"
First, by applying St. Paul to statutory sections with lengthy legisla-
tive histories, Fircrest vastly broadens St. Paul. Although St. Paul and its
progeny employed poor reasoning, the legislative history of the sections
at issue in those cases was fairly simple, with the sections' antecedents
easily ascertained. The four cases that followed St. Paul each involved
acts amended in legislative sessions closely following their original en-
actment, with no intervening amendments, so there was no difficulty
identifying the original act; the "original acts" were the direct "parents"
of the subsequent amendatory acts.190
190. In Belancsik v. Overlake Mem'l Hosp., 80 Wash. 2d 111, 114-15, 492 P.2d 219, 221
(1971), plaintiffs challenged a nonclaim statute, arguing that it violated the subject-in-title rule;
plaintiffs did not claim a single-subject violation. The challenged section was in Laws of 1967 Ex-
traordinary Session, ch. 106, entitled "probate law and procedure; prescribing changes in probate
procedure[.]" In Belancsik, the "original act" was the 1965 act that created title 11 and the entire
probate code. Laws of 1965, ch. 145. See supra notes 68-69 and accompanying text (recodification
process). The 1965 act had previously been upheld against a subject-in-title challenge in In re Estate
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In many other instances, however, a statute may have myriad legis-
lative ancestors, ancestors too numerous or remote to trace up the "fam-
ily tree" for purposes of identifying an "original act." The "original title"
envisioned in Fircrest could, perhaps, be identified if sections of an act
were always amended together for the same purpose in subsequent legis-
lation, without intervening amendments, as generally happened in the St.
Paul "offspring." But more frequently, sections of an "original act" will
subsequently be amended in different combinations, under different ti-
tles, and for different purposes. To use a previously cited example,
RCW 9.94A.510, establishing felony seriousness levels, has been
amended over 70 times since it was enacted in 1983 in "AN ACT Re-
lated to the sentencing of criminal offenders."' 9' "Amendatory acts"
containing this section include scores of both new sections and other
amendatory sections. 192  "Amendatory titles" for these bills are both
broad and narrow, and include "sentence enhancement for sex crimes
of Wiltermood, 78 Wash. 2d 238, 472 P.2d 536 (1970). None of the sections in the "original act"
were amended in the 1965 special session that intervened between the "original act" and its 1967
descendant. In Water Dist. No. 105 v. State, 79 Wash. 2d 337, 340-41, 485 P.2d 66, 68-69 (1971),
plaintiffs claimed both subject-in-title and single-subject violations. In that case, ch. 135, Laws of
1967 Extraordinary Session amended Laws of 1963, ch. 111 under the title "water districts, authoriz-
ing the leasing out of real property[.]" None of the sections created in the 1963 act had been
amended before the 1967 amendatory act. The court resolved the subject-in-title argument by rea-
soning that the issue was not "whether the title of the act gives notice of the subject contained
therein" but "whether the title identifies the original act, and whether the matter in the body of the
amendatory act is germane to the subject expressed in the title of the original act." Id. at 340-41,
485 P.2d at 69. The court resolved the single-subject challenge separately, under the ordinary gen-
eral title/rational unity analysis. Id. at 341-42, 485 P.2d at 69. In Goodnoe Hills Sch. Dist. v. Forry,
52 Wash. 2d 868, 873-74, 329 P.2d 1083, 1085-86 (1958), 1955 legislation amended new sections
created in 1953 under the title "providing for participation by non-high school districts in providing
capital funds for financing the cost of high school facilities." Again, there were no intervening
amendments to these sections. Because the title of the 1953 act was general, it was sufficient to
include the annexation feature found in the 1955 law. Id. at 874. In Keeting v. PUD No. 1, 49
Wash. 2d 761, 763-64, 306 P.2d 762, 762 (1957), plaintiff raised both subject-in-title and single-
subject challenges to a 1955 act entitled "state government and providing for the conservation and
development of electric power resources." The 1955 act amended several sections and repealed one
section of the 1953 act, and added new sections to the chapter created by the 1953 act. There had
been no intervening amendments to the 1953 act. The court ruled that the 1955 law was amendatory
of ch. 281, laws of 1953, and cited St. Paul and the 1943 3d edition of Sutherland. Id. at 763; see
supra notes 106-107. The court reasoned that the powers granted in the 1955 law could have been
grated in the 1953 law, meeting the subject-in-title test under St. Paul. Keeting, 49 Wash. 2d at 764,
306 P.2d at 762. The court also appeared to use St. Paul to resolve the single-subject test: "When
the two titles are considered together, the purposes announced by the [single-subject] cases are ac-
complished." Id. at 765, 306 P.2d at 765.
191. 1983 Wash. Sess. Laws ch. 115 § 3.
192. See WASH. REV. CODE § 9.94A.510 (listing acts that amended 1983 Wash. Sess. Laws ch.
115 § 3).
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against minors," "increasing penalties for armed crimes," "violence pre-
vention," and "criminal offenders."
'1 93
The statutes at issue in Fircrest, sections 2 and 4 of SHB 3055,
likewise had a long history of amendment. Both were enacted as part of
Initiative 242 in 1969.194 Before SHB 3055, Section 2, the implied con-
sent statute, had been amended twenty times under a variety of titles. 95
Section 4, the evidence and BAC testing statute at the heart of Mr. Jen-
sen's subject-in-title challenge, had been amended seven times under a
variety of titles. 196 There is simply no rational way for a court to identify
which act in this varied series of amendments is the "original act" against
which to weigh the validity of subsequent amendments to any of those
sections.
2. Fircrest: The "Original Act" is the Act that
Created the Entire RCW Title
The Fircrest plurality found a way to avoid the challenge of identi-
fying an "original act" for these repeatedly amended sections: it relied
upon the act that created the entire RCW Title in which the amended sec-
tions were codified. 197 By allowing the bill title of this "founder" legisla-
tion to embrace subsequent amendments and additions to a particular title
of the RCW, Fircrest potentially broadens any bill title vastly beyond the
scope contemplated by the legislature and permitted by Article II, section
19.
193. 2004 Wash. Sess. Laws ch. 176; 1995 Wash. Sess. Laws ch. 129 ("Hard Time for Armed
Crime initiative to legislature); 1994 Wash. Sess. Laws Sp. Sess., ch. 7 (omnibus act, see In re Boot,
130 Wn.3d 553, 566, 925 P.2d 964, 966 (1996)); 1990 Wash. Sess. Laws ch. 3 (omnibus act relating
to sex crimes, including civil commitment for sex offenders).
194. 1969 Wash. Sess. Laws ch. 1 §§ 1,3.
195. WASH. REV. CODE § 46.20.308 (listing acts that amended 1969 Wash. Sess. Laws ch. I §
I).
196. WASH. REV. CODE § 46.61.506 (listing acts that amended 1969 Wash. Sess. Laws ch. I §
3). The titles of these acts are as follows: 1969 Wash. Sess. Laws ch. 1 (1-242) (creating WASH. REV.
CODE § 46.61.506 as a new section in ch. 46.61), " providing that any person operating a motor
vehicle on the public highways shall be deemed to have consented to a breath test (if unconscious a
blood test) to determine intoxication, when arrested for any offense, provided the arresting officer
has reasonable grounds to believe such operator was driving or in control of a vehicle while intoxi-
cated; directing a six-month revocation of driving privileges for a person refusing such test after
having been advised of his rights and consequences of refusal; providing hearing and appeal proce-
dures; and reducing the blood alcohol percentage necessary to raise a presumption of intoxication";
1975 Wash. Sess. Laws 1st Ex. Sess. ch. 287 § 1, "motor vehicles"; 1979 Wash. Sess. Laws Ex.
Sess. ch. 176 § 5, "motor vehicle offenses involving alcohol or drugs"; 1986 Wash. Sess. Laws ch.
153 § 4, "alcohol breath testing"; 1987 Wash. Sess. Laws ch. 373 § 4, "blood alcohol content"; 1994
Wash. Sess. Laws ch. 275 § 26, "crimes involving alcohol, drugs, or mental problems"; 1995 Wash.
Sess. Laws ch. 332 § 18, "offenses involving alcohol or drugs"; 1998 Wash. Sess. Laws ch. 213 § 6,
"blood and breath alcohol standards for intoxication."
197. City of Fircrest v. Jensen, 158 Wash. 2d 384, 393, 143 P.3d 776, 781 (2006).
Perspective on City of Fircrest v. Jensen
Fircrest concluded that the "original act" for SHB 3055 was Chap-
ter 12, Laws of 1961. 98 Enacted as one of the many comprehensive re-
codifications of the 1950s and 1960s, 199 Chapter 12 created the entire
modem motor vehicle code, Title 46, by recodifying into that single
RCW Title diverse motor vehicle laws with numerous ancestors. 200 New
Title 46 encompassed all preexisting and new sections of law relating to
motor vehicles.20 1 By the time SHB 3055 was enacted in 2004, the 1961
"original act" had been subject to 43 years of legislative natural selec-
tion, with the hundreds of sections in this Title individually amended,
reenacted, and repealed many times under many titles for many reasons.
For Fircrest and St. Paul's purposes, the family tree of the "original act"
relating to "vehicles" thus embraced hundreds, if not thousands, of Dar-
winian descendants. Yet Fircrest found this astonishingly broad "origi-
nal act" provided a family name for all of its progeny:
The title of the original act reads, "AN ACT Relating to vehicles
.... " The scope of the original act includes the creation of Title
46 of the Revised Code of Washington and deals specifically with
motor vehicles ... the title of SHB 3055 adequately announces it is
amending the Motor Vehicle Act.
202
Under this analysis, by looking back to the title of the act that created the
entire motor vehicle code, an amendatory act "[r]elating to intermediate
drivers' licenses" could also embrace amendments to "admissibility of
DUI tests," so long as the ministerial portions of the bill title indicated
amendments to Title 46, because both bills descend from the same great-
grandparent "original act" entitled "AN ACT Relating to vehicles."
By looking back to the title of the "original act" that created an en-
tire title of the RCW, the Fircrest plurality judicially broadens the title of
any bill, no matter how specifically the legislature might have chosen to
write the title of a particular piece of legislation. Fircrest's use of the
recodification act as the "original act" moves beyond St. Paul and that
case's progeny by abandoning the need for any substantive link between
the "original act" and the "amendatory act" other than shared codifica-
tion in the broadest existing statutory classification (i.e., Title 46, Motor
Vehicles; e.g., Title 9A, Criminal Code, Title 29A, Elections). Taken to
its logical conclusion, Fircrest permits a bill that amends a particular
section in a RCW Title to encompass any other amendment to any other
section in that Title, so long as both sections were part of the original
198. Id. at 393, 143 P.3d at 781.
199. See supra notes 66-67.
200. 1961 Wash. Sess. Laws ch. 12. See Explanatory Note, 1961 Wash. Sess. Laws ch. 12.
201. Id. It contained hundreds of sections.
202. Fircrest, 158 Wash. 2d at 393, 143 P.3d at 781 (emphasis added).
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recodification act forty to fifty years ago. After Fircrest, legislators, liti-
gants, and members of the public may no longer be certain whether a
bill's subject truly remains limited to the subject matter statement in the
bill title chosen by the legislature.
3. The "Original Act" Wasn't Even a Direct
"Ancestor" of SHB 3055
In relying on Chapter 12, Laws of 1961 as "the original act" whose
title could be used to embrace subsequent amendments,2 °3 the Fircrest
plurality made a further error: None of the three Fircrest opinions recog-
nized that Chapter 12 was not the true "original act" for the sections in
question. Sections 2 and 4 of SHB 3055 were originally enacted as new
sections by Initiative 242 in 1969204 and were merely codified in Title 46,
which had been created by the 1961 act. These sections were grafted
onto the Title 46 family tree, but were not in the line of descent from the
1961 "original act." The "original act" was neither a "parent" of the
2004 "amendatory act" nor even a more remote ancestor.
By failing to recognize that the sections at issue were not part of the
"original act," the plurality applied a Lamarckian 20 5 analysis to legisla-
tion, under which an act's progeny may inherit the acquired characteris-
tics of an "ancestor." The "original" 1961 act relating to motor vehicles
acquired characteristics in the form of new "original" sections added to
Title 46 in a 1969 initiative. These 1969 sections, in turn, produced off-
spring of their own, in the form of multiple subsequent amendments. Yet
according to the plurality, all such progeny were embraced by the title of
the original act "Relating to vehicles, 20 6 the "step-grandparent" not in
the direct ancestral line. Mere codification in a single RCW title thus
turns that title into an "original act" whose initial bill title becomes a
family name that legitimizes all amendments to all "original" sections
subsequently codified within it. For purposes of a constitutional subject-
in-title analysis the Fircrest plurality has reduced the entire state code to
203. Id. at 393, 143 P.3d at 781.
204. 1969 Wash. Sess. Laws ch. 1.
205. JEAN-BAPTISTE DE LAMARCK, ZOOLOGICAL PHILOSOPHY: EXPOSITION WITH REGARD TO
THE NATURAL HISTORY OF ANIMALS 113 (Hugh Elliot trans., Macmillan, London 1914) (reprinted
University of Chicago Press 1984) (1809).
All the acquisitions or losses wrought by nature on individuals, through the influence of
the environment in which their race has long been placed, and hence through the influ-
ence of the predominant use or permanent disuse of any organ; all these are preserved by
reproduction to the new individuals which arise, provided that the acquired modifications
are common to both sexes, or at least to the individuals which produce the young.
Id.
206. Fircrest, 158 Wash. 2d at 393, 143 P.3d at 781.
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a few key acts-genetic "founders"--created during the recodification
process forty to fifty years ago.2°7
V. CONCLUSION
By eliminating the requirement that an amendatory bill's title con-
tain a substantive statement of the bill's subject matter, the Fircrest plu-
rality opinion conflicts with legislative implementation of the ti-
tle/subject rule and frustrates the constitutional purposes of notice and
disclosure. Further, the plurality's misplaced reliance on an "original
act" and its progeny's genealogy conflicts with the realities of statutory
evolution.
While Fircrest may have upheld the legislature's purpose by af-
firming the legislation at issue, the plurality's use of St. Paul and the re-
sulting confusion about legislative titles will confound legislators,
judges, practitioners, and the public alike. Fortunately, there was not a
majority on the court to uphold continued use of the St. Paul reasoning.
If future litigants raise Article II, section 19 arguments based on the Fir-
crest plurality, courts must recognize why a bill title's subject matter
statement is the constitutional title for both legislative and judicial pur-
poses. Fircrest and St.Paul are "incorrect and harmful" offshoots that
should be pruned from the jurisprudential family tree.
207. See supra notes 66-67 (recodification process).
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